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Abstract 
 
Dabiq, the official English language publication of ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, has been 
widely circulated online, and has gained a relatively large audience. The study discusses the ways in 
which the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses their official publication, Dabiq, to promote 
its objectives and to spread terror. In this study, a content analysis is conducted to examine 
terrorist rhetoric in the magazine and its mediation for the sake of fulfilling the group’s 
objectives. The study uses two main theories: the theory of framing analyzing how ISIS frames 
itself, its supporters and its opponents, and the theory of selective moral disengagement, 
analyzing the mechanisms ISIS uses through Dabiq to morally disengage their soldiers and 
supporters, thus allowing them to commit more violent acts without exercising their moral 
agency or feeling empathetic towards their victims. The content analysis was conducted on the 
whole Dabiq population (15 issues, containing 206 articles).  The findings show that ISIS attempts 
to frame itself as a caliphate and a state, and a gateway to heaven, and its fighters and supporters as moral 
agents, and fighters for God, as opposed to the framing of their opponents and victims, which were 
framed as enemies of God. The interesting finding was that all supporters and fighters of ISIS are very 
strategically framed as part of the in-group, while all opponents and victims are framed as part of the out-
group. On the other hand, when analyzing the rhetoric of the magazine from the perspective of the theory 
of selective moral disengagement, the findings suggest that all 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement are 
very significantly present in the rhetoric of the magazine, with the most used mechanism in the magazine, 
moral justification, being present in 97% of the total population of the magazine, and least mechanism 
used, dehumanization of victims, being present in 41% of the total population of the magazine. Through 
the study, it was found that ISIS attempts to assemble a united political identity for itself and its 
followers by means of framing the in-group and out-group, and morally disengaging its in-group to 
keep it loyal, supportive and active towards achieving its cause and purpose, and to have it enforce its 
attitudes of rejection and vicious behavior towards the out-group. 
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This is dedicated to all those victims who fell as a result of the moral 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, since the year 2000, the world has witnessed more than a 250 percent 
growth in internet usage (Kim et.al., 2009). With this growth comes the positive aspects of the 
sharing of information, the vast online information sources, the crossing of cultural borders, and 
the obliteration of access borders there comes the negative aspects of Western information 
dominance and the sharing of information that could potentially do more harm than good, the 
most vivid example being online terrorist activity and recruitment.  
 
This trend started when Al Qaeda, after the fall of Afghanistan, started having very strong 
online presence and recruiting jihadists, just through their online material (Schorn, 2007). Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi, founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq, used the internet to promote his organization, 
and held out a number of attacks, including the beheading of Nicolas Berg, abducted American 
civilian, just to provide material for broadcast (Schorn, 2007). CBS reporter Daniel Schorn calls 
it the assault with “bytes not bullets” (Schorn, 2007). 
“It is certain that virtual reality is doing real damage with 
intelligence, recruiting, fundraising and the spread of Islamic 
extremism” (Schorn, 2007). 
 
The internet has provided a vehicle for radicalization, Jihadist internet, where young men 
who have been exposed to radical material turn up on the battlefield and join radical 
organizations (Schorn, 2007) such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. United 
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States Army Brigadier General John Custer, the central command head of intelligence said that 
since 9/11, jihadist internet sites have increased dramatically, reaching about 5,000 sites.  
One major factor contributing to the jihadist internet population in the time being is the media 
produced by ISIS. ISIS has been known for its brutality and vulgarity. It is a group known for its 
effective propaganda spectacles. According to Ben Labidi, “ISIS’s propagandists are tireless, 
constructing spectacles to win the hearts and minds of more alienated Westerners,” (Ben Labidi, 
2016). ISIS’ media is known for its extremely professional production, and its large magnitude 
of distribution and circulation. Using its media, ISIS provides coverage of its terrorist and violent 
attacks and propagates itself and its causes, thus magnetizing young men and women to join its 
armies (AlHodhod, 2016). In its pages, Dabiq very violent images and wording. The magazine 
hosts picture of bloody corpses, demolished buildings and houses, and explicit beheadings. To 
maximize its magnetization, Dabiq uses very advanced graphics and slick images, a form of 
presentation that gives the illusion of a science fiction movie or a video game (McCoy, 2014). 
 
However, In Dabiq, along with the usage of uses very graphic portrayals of its violences against 
its opponents, comes the usage of Quranic verses to justify the violent acts and legitimize the 
nature of the organization. This combination is believed and intended to capture and inspire 
young warriors into joining the group and fighting for the caliphate and for Islam (“The 
Jamestown Foundation”, 2014). This study focuses on identifying and analyzing the techniques 
with which ISIS uses Dabiq to promote its causes and to disengage its audiences morale, causing 
them to further accept their violent behavior, support it, and take part in it. 
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
ISIS has been recognized for using its media in very strategic ways which purposely have a very 
large and amplified effect on their audience. Through Dabiq, their official magazine, alone, it is 
estimated that ISIS has magnetized and recruited over 12,000 fighters, who migrated to ISIS’ 
controlled territories. ISIS’ publication, Dabiq, acts as a crucial tool for the propaganda of the 
group’s purposes and acts. Therefore, it is very crucial to analyze the group’s media content and 
rhetoric to study and identify the tools they use to spread their messages, and to study the 
rationale behind their terrorist radical behavior.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Chapter 2 
Background 
2.1: Terrorism 
Terrorism, as defined by Wilkinson in his book “Terrorism versus democracy”, is “the 
systematic use of coercive intimidation” to achieve political objectives (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 17). 
Operationally, terrorism is the use of violence and criminal acts against civilians with the 
purpose of inflicting severe injury or death, and in some cases taking hostages, to provoke a state 
of terror and create an environment of extreme fear amongst a group of individuals, a nation, or a 
region (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 4). Typical methods of modern terrorism include shooting attacks 
and assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking and kidnapping, as well as hijacking (Wilkinson, 
2011, Pg 17). Terrorist attacks also involve “attacks on random or symbolic targets,”(Wilkinson, 
2011, Pg 4). 
The effect of terrorism, according to Wilkinson, goes beyond the immediate pain inflicted 
on the victim. “Terrorism is directed at a wider target,” (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 4). It is used to 
intimidate a nation, threaten a population, or pressure a government or society to advance a 
political, religious, or ideological course of action of serious magnitude (Townshend, 2011, p. 2) 
According to Townshend, “terrorism is a distinctive form of modern political agency, intended to 
threaten the ability of the state to ensure the security of its members, and thus its claim to 
legitimacy,” (Townshend, 2011, p. 6). 
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1.2 Religious Terror 
Religious terror has been gaining immense media attention in the recent years. Hoffman 
discusses the main characteristics of religious terrorism in his book Inside Terrorism. The first 
characteristic is that religious terrorism exercises a theological nature for the demands and 
operation of the groups. Hoffman argues that religious terrorism has a divine purpose and not a 
political one, and is carried out with a theological imperative. Religious terrorists use religion to 
justify their acts and to gain recruits. In religious terrorist groups, all leadership roles are 
occupied by clerical figures. The second characteristic of religious terrorism is that terrorist 
groups do not clearly define a specific enemy, but rather try to “eliminate” a broad category of 
enemies, and therefore practice mass amounts of indiscriminate killing. The third characteristic 
is, however, the most crucial and most destructive of the characteristics of these groups, being 
that religious terrorists do not attempt to recognize any source of power or authority other than 
themselves (Hoffman, 2006). Hoffman argues that the aim of religious terrorism is not 
persuasion, but rather elimination (Hoffman, 2006). 
Perhaps one of the most prominent terrorist groups in America is the Ku Klux Klan, a 
white Protestant movement that mainly attacks people from ethnic origins and Catholics. The 
group advocates for white supremacy, anti-catholicism, and homophobism, among other 
properties (Olson, 2009; Feldman, 1997). Another prominent terrorist group is the Army of God, 
a Christian American anti-abortion group which killed and kidnapped physicians who performed 
abortions, and even planted bombs in abortion clinics in the United States, all under the name of 
God (Cotter, 2011). 
 A series of surveys in the 1990’s “asserted that the religious imperative for terrorism is 
the most important defining characteristic of terrorism today,” (Townshend, 2011, p. 98).  
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1.3: Islamic Fundamentalism 
The shift from the 1980’s to the 1990’s saw the growth of a new remarkable 
phenomenon, religious Islamist fanaticism (Townshend, 2011, p. 97-98). One of the mainly used 
tactics in religious Islamic terrorism is suicide bombing, and the idea of self-sacrifice. 
Psychologist Arie Kruglanski discusses the psychology of self-sacrifice in his article 
“Psychological insights into Indonesian Islamic terrorism: The what, the how and the why of 
violent extremism”, saying that the motivational underpinnings of suicide bombers is a universal 
process of radicalization used by terrorist leaders almost everywhere in the world. 
 
“The idea that self-sacrifice is a particularly effective way of restoring or enhancing 
one’s significance isn’t just a matter of ideological dictate. It also rests on solid 
psychological foundation…  [The augmentation principle states that] the greater the 
sacrifice, the more one gives up (i.e. the more pronounced the self-denial), the more 
effective joining the Jihad is in bestowing significance upon oneself, and the greater 
the sense that it is an assured path to betterment, glory, and eternal life. Or the ‘no 
pain no gain’ dictum is translated (in the logically fallacious way) into ‘if pain then 
gain’.” (Kruglanski, 2013- pp114) 
1.4: The Rise of Islamist Terrorist Groups 
 In modern history, Islamist terrorist groups have been portrayed as the most dangerous 
and most notorious (DePetris, 2014; Delman, 2015). They have gained immense media attention 
and have been portrayed as the most lethal groups. These groups are Boko Haram, Taliban, Al 
Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (DePetris, 2014; Delman, 2015).  
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Boko Haram 
Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based Islamist group committed to the Prophet’s preaching 
and teachings for propagation and jihad. He group is opposed to “Western” education and try to 
stand in the way of the dissemination of Western education ("Foreign Terrorist Organizations", 
2013). The group promotes a version of Islam which declares all forms of Western teachings, 
social behaviors and political activities to be forbidden, or “haram” for Muslims (Chothia, 2012). 
The group was established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, aiming to spread Islamic teachings, 
recruit jihadists, and to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (Johnson, 2011). 
Before 2009, the group did not have violent plans, however, after rising clashes between 
Muslims and Christians and trouble by the government, where many members were arrested and 
killed, the group started taking more violent initiatives and carrying out lethal attacks (Analysis: 
Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals, 2011). In 2009, members of Boko Haram carried 
out a number of suicide bombings (Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals, 
2011) and assassinations, in 2010 they staged a prison break in Bauchi, freeing more than seven 
hundred inmates. Ever since then, they’ve been carrying out severely violent attacks against 
civilians, they murdered sixty-five students sleeping over at an agricultural college, in 2013, they 
beheaded hundreds of civilians travelling on Nigerian roads using chainsaws, and in 2014, they 
abducted more than two hundred school girls (Johnson, 2011). Boko Haram now operates in 
Northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and Lake Chad Basin ("Foreign Terrorist Organizations", 
2013). 
Even though Boko Haram did not establish solid online media promotion or publications 
in the past, in 2015, it launched a Twitter feed account, which, as Bull claims, acts as a valuable 
tool for the recruitment of fighters and supporters (Bull, 2015). Boko Haram, according to Bull, 
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is, following in the trails and learning from Al-Qaeda and ISIS, getting to know how to use this 
valuable media tool to fulfill its objectives (Bull, 2015). 
Taliban  
Taliban was formed in 1992 as a group of jihadists resisting the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan (Laub, 2011). The group ruled Afghanistan, under the leadership of Muslim cleric 
Mullah Omar, from 1996 to 2001. During his rule, he granted sanctuary to Al Qaeda and 
neglected basic state functions and social services (Laub, 2011). Omar enforced very strict 
penalties on behavior that Taliban deemed un-Islamic. They required women to wear head-to-toe 
burqas, they jailed men whose beards were deemed too short, and they banned music and 
television (Laub, 2011). 
Nowadays, Taliban is a major fighting force in Afghanistan and poses a great threat to the 
Afghani government (“Analysis: Who are the Taliban?", 2013). They also control parts of north-
west Pakistan, where they carried out a number of suicide attacks and bombings, and are 
threatening to destabilize its government. Political analysts believe the only way the Afghani 
government can run peacefully in the future is if the government negotiates with Taliban 
(“Analysis: Who are the Taliban?", 2013). 
 
            As a means to reach transnational audiences, Taliban established its official English 
language magazine, Azan (Ingram, 2015). Producers of the magazine announced that the 
magazine was a vehicle for muslim communities to know the truth about Islam, and to join in the 
fight against the enemies of God and of prophet Muhammad (Ingram, 2015).   
Al Qaeda 
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Islamist terrorists groups started rising with the aim of jihad, or fighting for God. They 
are mainly composed of Islamic extremist soldiers fighting under a leader. One of the most 
prominent terrorist groups in the world is Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is dedicated to opposing non-
Islamic governments with force and violence. The term Al Qaeda means “the base”. The group 
was founded in 1989 by Usama Bin Laden (“Al Amir” [the prince], or the leader of the group), 
Ayman El Zawahri and other Islamist leaders, and was headquartered in Peshwar, Pakistan. Al 
Qaeda relocated to Sudan in 1991, then back to Afghanistan in 1996, and has remained there 
since (Wander, 2008). 
Al Qaeda identified and killed anyone who was suspected of collaborating against it. The 
group violently opposed the United States of America for its views on Islam, for its support of 
“infidel” governments such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, for its involvement with the 
United Nations, for its involvement in the Gulf War, and for its conviction and imprisonment of 
Al Qaeda members and associates. Therefore, Al Qaeda declared jihad (a holy war) on the 
United States (PBS, "Background: Al Qaeda"). 
Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden and the group sponsored, managed, and/or financially 
supported training camps in Afghanistan to train members of the group to be jihadists (holy 
fighters). They trained them in the use firearms, explosives, chemical weapons, and other 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the use of security and counterintelligence methods 
codes and passwords. The camps were also used to organize and plan operations against United 
States targets (PBS, "Background: Al Qaeda"). 
Gradually, the scale and magnitude of the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda got bigger. In an 
interview in 1998, Usama Bin Laden said "We do not have to differentiate between military or 
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civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets.” ("The rise of Islamist terrorist groups", 
2004) 
In 1993, the group detonated a 500 KG bomb in the World Trade Center in New York 
City, killing six people and injuring over a thousand (Wander, 2008). In 1997, Al Qaeda gunman 
killed 62 tourists in a massacre in Luxor city in Egypt. The largest Al Qaeda act, however, 
happened on September 11th,2001, when 2,974 people were killed in the hijacking of the planes 
and the their crashing into the two towers of World Trade Center in New York City, and into the 
West side of the Pentagon. The attacks caused Ten billion dollars of property and infrastructure 
damage (Wander, 2008). The September 11 attacks were the largest suicide attacks, where 19 Al 
Qaeda members hijacked four planes and crashed deliberately crashed them. 
After the attacks of September 11, Islamophobia, a term which was first recorded in The 
Journal of Theological Studies in 1923, became a very widespread phenomenon and very 
popular in common usage. Islamophobic attacks increased 1,700% after 9/11 (Rose, 2013). Hate 
crimes against Muslims also drastically increased, from 28 crimes annually to 481 annually, to 
the extent that Indian Sikhs were often killed for being mistaken for Muslims (Rose, 2013). 
Not only did Al Qaeda take advantage of traditional mass media to disseminate its videos 
and messages, but it also created its own official online English-language publication, Inspire 
(Lemieux, et al., 2014). Inspire, according to Kirke, appeals to the youth who have been 
alienated in their communities, to try to lure them to join the fighters of AL-Qaeda. The 
magazine uses a Western, stylish format, as to be in congruence with the contemporary of pop-
culture (Kirke, 2015). The magazine features editorial content by foreign captives and fighters, 
guides to making one’s own explosives, and instruction on how to avoid being detected before 
performing a terrorist act (Lemieux, et al., 2014). Inspire puts forward and emphasizes the epic 
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conflict between muslims and crusaders, as well as the ummah and the political regimes of the 
Middle East and the West (Kirke, 2015). Inspire attempts to drive its target audience to 
participate in defending the ummah in their homeland, or risk being labeled as a traitor and 
enemy of AL Qaeda and the muslim ummah (Kirke, 2015). 
 
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
Arab states, in modern history, have been unable to formulate an identity to achieve 
social cohesion, and to incorporate all social sectors. They practice tyranny, multiple forms of 
corruption, and demand submission to the ruling regime. Arab states have also been unable to 
fulfill their responsibilities towards their citizens. They have submitted to Western hegemony 
and the Israeli occupation. They have shown inability to serve their citizens, and have 
continuously resorted to dealing with them using extreme violence (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). These 
factors contributed to the rise of non-state actors, whom in return have adopted violence as a 
method. These non-state entities aim at either confronting and challenging state power and 
violence, and/or protecting the interests of certain communities, with the most prominent 
examples being Hamas and Hezbollah. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria falls within this 
framework (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). 
“Their existence is an expression of the state's’ inability to represent 
the interests of citizens,”(Al-Ibrahim, 2015). 
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1.5: ISIS RISES AMIDST POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
“ISIS rapidly exploited the chaos that the Arab Spring has brought in its wake,” (Phillips, 
2014). 
During the Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, jihadists and suicide bombers became an 
eminent part of the turmoil. Later, in April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created ISIS presenting 
a dominant jihadist alternative (Holbrook, 2015). The Syrian civil war and the disintegration of 
its government provided an opportunity for jihadists to, as Phillips explains it, “gain battlefield 
experience” and invite new recruits (Phillips, 2014). 
When ISIS was first created in northern Syria, it spread fear among the locals. It was 
brutal. However, many were in favour of it as it imposed some rule after two years of utter 
chaos, thuggery, murders, thievery, and anarchy. ISIS replaced checkpoint officers  and tax 
collectors with their own members, it imposed its own ruling system, the Sharia system 
(Cheterian, 2015). In the areas it took power of, ISIS was also able to regain some control of the 
civil war where neither the Syrian loyalist forces were targeted, nor were the Syrian civilians 
targeted by air force, unlike the areas that were not under ISIS’ rule, such as Aleppo and the 
suburbs of Damascus, which endured months of barrel-bombing (Cheterian, 2015).   
After the capturing of the Syrian city of Raqqa, ISIS gained control of its oil wells, which 
allowed the organization to finance itself and its operations. ISIS then had its independant 
resources for income. It became wealthier, bolder, and more threatening than any other terrorist 
organizations or jihadists (Phillips, 2014). This facilitated the attack and invasion of the Iraqi 
territories (Phillips, 2014).   
In May 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s intelligence service sent warnings to 
Baghdad and Washington D.C. that ISIS was approaching the Kurdish border of Mosul. Their 
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warnings were ignored and ISIS did eventually seize Mosul and, subsequently, raced down to 
Baghdad (Phillips, 2015). The Iraqi army, which included 750,000 men, completely collapsed. 
The government and security forces were disintegrated, and police officers, terrified, removed 
their uniforms and tried to blend into the community. During that time, the conflict was heavily 
violent and about one million people were displaced (Phillips, 2015). 
In the process, ISIS gained control of all the Iraqi army’s weaponry, sophisticated 
artillery provided by the United States army, and became a very well-equipped army. ISIS also 
robbed the Central Bank in Mosul, garnering $425 million, and seized oil sale revenues.. ISIS 
was then a very rich and dangerous body (Phillips, 2015). By the end of August 2014, ISIS had 
over 31,500 fighters, and was recruiting foreign fighters including, British, French, American, 
Turkish, Tunisian, Afghan, and Chechen recruits (Phillips, 2015). 
1.6: THE CALIPHATE 
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has two main defining strategic priorities: declaring a 
caliphate and attacking its sectarian rivals (mainly shiites). The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
declared itself a caliphate and a State on June 28th, 2014, the first day of Ramadan (“The 
Jamestown Foundation”, 2014).  
The constitution of ISIS is influenced by the post-caliphate-Islamist movement where it 
focuses on the unity of Muslims under a caliphate ruled by a caliph (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). The 
Caliph being Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Fromson, et al., 2015). This concept is also governed by the 
desire for unlimited expansion and the conquering of as many lands as possible to be united 
under one caliphate, and the ruling of all Muslims (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). 
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ISIS declared itself a caliphate following its remarkable victories over the rivals of 
Bashar Al Assad’s regime, and over the government of Iraq and the Kurdish forces (Hashim, 
2014). After declaring its caliphate, ISIS started playing the role of state to feed its propaganda. 
It established its own courts, infrastructure, and even its own religious police, Al-Hisba, ensuring 
the strict application of the conservative Sharia laws and regulations (Turner, 2015). 
Nonetheless, not only did ISIS target forces of the regime and resistance groups, but it also made 
very little effort to eliminate the sufferings of the citizens it ruled. ISIS heavily intimidated the 
population into submission and alienated them, it paid little attention to the infrastructure, and it 
killed and imprisoned large numbers of citizens, which, as Turner argues, does not differentiate 
them from Arab government rulers (Turner, 2015). 
“Legitimacy stems from providing services” (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
Katagiri explains that there are three necessary steps to build a state: one must build 
organized armed forces, establish a centralized state, and win local support. Without those three 
steps, the state could be regarded as illegitimate (Katagiri, 2015). Katagiri argues that those 
necessary steps for building a state must be accomplished and that the state must provide 
services, order, and administration for locals. However, ISIS was unable to do so because it did 
not have the legitimacy and resources, and because they did not win people’s hearts and minds, 
and therefore sustaining guerrilla operations and maintaining manpower would be very difficult 
(Katagiri, 2015).  This type of state constitution is called ‘competitive control’.  It is the idea that 
insurgents gain strength through the use a range of methods, from persuasion to coercion, as well 
as their ability to mobilize and manipulate the population. In the meantime, ISIS fighters became 
highly unpopular following their mass civilian killings, imprisonment, torture, rape and sexual 
harassment, death threats, and sexual enslavement of women (Katagiri, 2015).   
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Fromson and Simon, however, argue that ISIS’ relative legitimacy is brought by its 
offerings of goods and services, but most of all, for offering security to its allies (Fromson, et al., 
2015). 
They report the sayings of one citizen from Mosul, who expressed similar attitudes and 
said that “the situation is quiet and normal now in Mosul. There is no pressure from ISIS. 
Yesterday there was a parade by them in the streets to show off the weapons that they took from 
the Iraqi army. Schools and hospitals have opened. People ... feel safe,” (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
Another citizen, Mohammed, a trader in the city of Mosul, as reported by the Financial Times, 
said that “Compared to past rulers, ISIS is a lot easier to deal with. Just don’t piss them off and 
they leave you alone… If they could only maintain services — then people would support them 
until the last second” (Fromson, et al., 2015).  ISIS has also left the majority of government 
technicians employed and in their jobs at oil facilities, power plants, and infrastructure sites, a 
strategy that Fromson and Simon argue is especially clever to keep the relatively normal life and 
daily systems operating (Fromson, et al., 2015).  
However, these reports contradict others and understate how atrocious the situation is. 
According to one report, Mosul hardly has any drinkable water, due to the lack of chlorine, 
Raqqa receives only 3 or 4 hours of electricity daily, and as opposed to the contract between ISIS 
and the governed, most of the governed citizens have been living in dire war conditions for years 
(Fromson, et al., 2015). 
ISIS exploited the war in Syria and the failures in the Iraqi government and succeeded in 
establishing its caliphate and controlling territory fairly quickly (Holbrook, 2015). Holbrook 
argues that the reason why ISIS thrived was because of its material strength, its ruthless and 
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well-planned tactics, and because it responded to the needs and concerns of the Sunnis in Syria 
and Iraq (Holbrook, 2015). 
1.7: ISIS’ Framed SUCCESSES 
ISIS’ victories, be it battlefield victories or propaganda victories cannot be disregarded. 
Its recent successes are, as Phillips puts it, “stunning and disturbing,” (Phillips, 2014). Its 
successes indicate jihadist extremists’ resilience and ability to adapt, as well as their eminent 
growth and capability to learn and develop. ISIS presents forceful threat to the stability of global 
peace and security, and is now arguably the richest and the most dangerous jihadist organization 
(Phillips, 2014). 
By the end of 2014, ISIS’ daily revenue was estimated to be from $3 to $5 million, of 
which 3$ million come from smuggling oil alone. ISIS also taxed the citizens, shopkeepers, and 
companies that resided on ISIS-claimed territories. Moreover, ISIS performed significant 
criminal activity including bank robberies, kindapings for ransom, seizing properties, and looting 
antiquities. The group claimed to have a $2 billion budget (Fromson, et al., 2015). This wealth 
supported the construction of the caliphate and its government.  
Exhibiting the image of a successful, prosperous and functioning state is key for the 
recruitment of international fighters (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
“ In one photo disseminated on Twitter, a group of women in black abayas and niqabs pose 
casually on a white BMW under the heading ‘chillin’ in the khilafa, lovin’ life” (Fromson, et al., 
2015). 
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1.8: ISIS’ BRUTALITY 
“There is something nauseating about the violence of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS). Its celebration of brutality – decapitating prisoners and 
burning them alive, crucifying and exhibiting its victims – sickens even from a 
distance, ” (Cheterian, 2015). 
 
Citizens in the territories conquered by ISIS are forced to choose one of two options: 
joining, or at least accepting, the new group, or death (Kfir, 2015).      
In June 2013 in Aleppo, ISIS fighters executed 15 year old Mohammad Katta, a street-
coffee vendor, in front of his parents. Katta was executed for the usage of an expression that ISIS 
considered sacrilegious. ISIS also displays the corpses they crucified in Raqqa’s central square. 
On one occasion, an Australian fighter , Khaled Sharrouf, published photographs of his seven 
year old son with a decapitated head in his hands, “posting his child’s lost innocence on the 
Internet for all to see,” (Cheterian, 2015).  
In the summer of 2014, while ISIS fighters were taking over Deir ez-Zor, they killed over 
700 Shiite civilians. In Mosul in May 2014, ISIS fighters performed an ethnic cleansing, and 
banished 30,000 Christians towards Erbil (Cheterian, 2015). Then in August of the same year, 
ISIS fighters attacked Yazidis- followers of an ancient religion derived from the Muslim, 
christian and Persian faiths, that is rumored to have been founded in the 11th century- in Sinjar. 
They assassinated about 500 Yazidis, including 40 children, they threatened the whole 
population with death threats, they kidnapped women and girls and forced them into sex slavery, 
and they led about 130,000 residents to flee to Kurdistan (Jalabi, 2014). Not only did ISIS 
attempt a genocide of its rivals, but it also exhibited it on social media (Cheterian, 2015). ISIS 
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celebrates and exhibits violence, and uses it as a tool of terror against their rivals, and as a tool 
for media attention (Cheterian, 2015).  
ISIS uses grievance, insecurity, and a narrowing of the religion marketplace to develop 
its caliphate and to recruit its regional and international fighters (Kfir, 2015). This, as Kfir puts it, 
is “arguably the most dangerous brand of Al-Qaedism,” (Kfir, 2015). This reinforces the notion 
that Al Qaeda and ISIS’ ideological basis aren’t religion, but the use of religion to justify the 
usage of extreme violence (Kfir, 2015).  
ISIS’ success is attributed to three aspects: the size and quality of its troops, its sheer 
aggressiveness, and its highly sophisticated artillery (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
In its attacks, ISIS adopted a very aggressive combat style which relies on the elements of 
mobility and surprise, therefore, its advanced artillery comes in handy combining huge numbers 
of armed pickup trucks and tanks and thus allowing it to quickly conquer a territory and achieve 
superiority, even if outnumbered (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
Extremism is by definition a relative concept, and within the context of militant Islam, al-
Qaeda now has the opportunity to present itself as the ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’ option 
(Holbrook, 2015).  
“In order to be constantly on our screens, in competition with other 
violent groups, ISIS has escalated its violence: when beheadings 
became familiar, ISIS introduced a new, shocking form – placing a 
prisoner in a cage and burning him to death,” (Cheterian, 2015).  
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1.9: MEMBERS AND RECRUITMENT 
ISIS’ leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi said that the group is comprised mainly of 
Bedouins and communities from the Syrian Desert, but it doesn’t stop at that. ISIS aims at being 
an international organization and, using modern methods of telecommunication, recruits fighters 
from all over the world (Al-Ibrahim, 2015).  
It has been estimated, by numerous sources including the National Intelligence Center of 
the United States, the Pentagon, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, that ISIS claimed as 
much as 200,000 deployable troops, recruited around 20,000 foreign fighters (mostly Western 
inexperienced fighters),  and rule as many as 7 -8 million people (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
Whether the estimates are fairly accurate doesn’t nullify the fact that ISIS is undoubtedly the 
biggest player in the fragmented Iraqi and Syrian landscape (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
 
ISIS is regarded as a machine for war, recruitment, and propaganda (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
1.10: DEFINING THEIR ENEMIES 
“ISIS declared all opponents unbelievers,” (Holbrook, 2015). 
According to Holbrook, as ISIS attempted to intensify its legitimacy, it declared every 
person, organization or entity that were nonbelievers in its methods as enemies of the state, and 
thus justifying its violence targets and its application of terror on these non-believers  (Holbrook, 
2015). Holbrook reported that ISIS regarded those unbelievers as the reason for the death of 
ISIS’ mujahideen, and that those unbelievers would be punished in the temporal world and in the 
afterlife (Holbrook, 2015). 
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1.11: THE CALIPHATE’S OBSTACLES 
ISIS became widely unpopular all over the world because of their brutality and violence, 
therefore, it is unlikely that their structured state would be regarded as legitimate (Katagiri, 
2015). In addition, even though ISIS is reported to earn 1-3 million dollars every day from Iraqi 
and Syrian oil exports, it does not have a stable income source, as it relies heavily on natural 
resources, which are expected to deplete, robberies, kidnapping, and forced taxation (Katagiri, 
2015). Moreover, ISIS has very loose allies outside its combat zones. Even though it has 
sympathizers such as Boko Haram, most of the collaboration is rhetorical and takes place in the 
online and on social media, but involves no cooperation in logistics, finance, or operations 
(Katagiri, 2015). 
1.12: AL QAEDA REACTION TO ISIS    
Ayman Al Zawahiri, the second in command of Al Qaeda, published a statement 
following the creation of ISIS declaring that ISIS was a “branch affiliated to al-Qaeda’ and that 
its ‘leader and soldiers pledge their loyalty to al-Qaeda ... and their leader Sheikh Osama Bin 
Laden, may God rest his soul in peace, and then myself after him,” (Holbrook, 2015). Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, however, declared ISIS an independent organization, and in February 2014, 
announced the revival of the Caliphate (Phillips, 2014). Phillips describes the break between AL 
Qaeda and ISIS and indicates that Al-Baghdadi remains Bin-Laden’s ideological heir, and 
exhibits similar sharpness in globally collecting extremists and gaining their support through 
controlling the basis of globalization and mass media platforms, however when it comes to 
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territorial rule, Al-Baghdadi was able to create a local caliphate, thus surpassing Bin-Laden’s 
fulfillment (Phillips, 2014). 
 Even though Al Qaeda never announced establishing a caliphate to be one of their 
objectives, Ayman Al-Zawahiri expressed his dismay of ISIS’ caliphate and, in an interview, 
said that unlike ISIS’ caliphate, Al Qaeda’s would be righteous and inclusive. He said that 
bringing the ummah together and unifying the whole Muslim world is their objective, and that 
Muslims need a rightly guided caliphate  (Holbrook, 2015).  
1.13: ISIS’ Media Strategy     
“The raison d’être of modern, small war forces is typically to win the 
populations support in order to implement their particular 
‘competitive system of control’ (that is, a politico-military apparatus) 
over that of their opponents” (Ingram, 2014). 
 
A huge component of ISIS’ success and existence relies on the usage of its media and its 
media strategies. ISIS stands apart for its sharp and well-planned  media strategies. It 
understands the media and uses it extremely well to achieve its goals (Farwell, 2014).Media and 
information operations have a very fundamental role in the success and development of ISIS. 
The main purpose for the usage of its media is to “shape the perceptions and polarize the support 
of its audiences”, (Ingram, 2014). ISIS founded a multidimensional media strategy that’s spread 
across multiple platforms to be able to target both its ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. With its media, ISIS 
targets local, regional, and international audiences, and offers its material in multiple languages, 
to increase its appeal to diverse global peoples. They produce Dabiq, their official online 
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magazine, they produce videos which they disseminate through YouTube and which they leak to 
official international news sources, they use social media forums such as Facebook, Diaspora 
and Twitter, they use multimedia phone messages which include text, pictures and videos, and 
they install billboards in the areas they control(Ingram, 2014).  
ISIS’ media is famed for its simple messages, striking graphic imagery, catchy phrases. 
All these components are backed up and augmented by ISIS’ actions and violence on the 
grounds (Ingram, 2014). ISIS disseminates its messages using one of two ways: officials’ 
statements released by its media center, or unofficial communications spread by its members. 
According to Ingram, ISIS’ media is governed by three traits: its reach, relevance and resonance, 
its synchronization with its politico-military action, and its usage of and centralization around the 
ISIS brand (Ingram, 2014). ISIS’ media is distinct for its diversity in style and format, and for the 
speed of the issuing of statements and communiqués, even if it takes time to produce the 
magazine, ISIS makes sure to communicate with its communities via text messages, press 
releases and statements issued through its various social media and online channels. There is a 
constant flow of information taking place (Ingram, 2014). ISIS also, through phone messages, 
sends greetings during official Islamic holidays, such as Ramadan and Eid, and distributes 
charity and food to its citizens. 
The first trait that describes ISIS’ media is its reach, relevance and resonance. Reach is 
the ability for a message to spread and reach target audiences (Ingram, 2014).  ISIS’ use of social 
media and online platforms, as an addition to its exploitation of mainstream media, has resulted 
in an incredible reach for their messages, to adversaries, journalists, supporters, and opponents. 
The group also uses cellular technology to address audiences on different poles of the 
technological spectrum (Farwell, 2014). 
28 
 
However for a message to reach masses of audiences, the message itself must be relevant 
to these audiences (Ingram, 2014). This is where relevance comes in. Relevance is the 
significance of the message and its presence within the audience’s context of social, cultural, and 
situational factors. The messages’ reach is complimented by its relevance to salient 
contemporary issues and events. Depending on the message’s reach and relevance, resonance 
takes place. Resonance is the message’s ability to resonate with the audiences and influence their 
perceptions. Resonance is the main key that ensures that ISIS’ information operations are not just 
pieces of disseminated information, but also tools influence (Ingram, 2014). One major 
contributing factor that adds to the resonance of information is its packaging: the very slick 
design of the magazine Dabiq, the very graphic material, and the strong wording of the messages 
(Ingram, 2014). These methods allowed the group to disseminate very powerful messages, 
images and videos depicting its members as fearsome and extremely violent warriors- messages 
that are used to intimidate the group’s opponents, build support among its followers, and recruit 
new members (Farwell, 2014). 
In order to maximize resonance, ISIS uses three main techniques: exploiting psychosocial 
forces among its audience, actively employing counter-narrative campaigns, and synchronizing 
its narratives with its actions (Ingram, 2014). ISIS exploits the psychosocial dynamics in the 
audiences by binding concepts and notions of crisis with the framed ‘out-group’ identities, and 
offering solutions to anyone represented and framed as being part of ISIS’ ‘in-group’ (Ingram, 
2014). ISIS stresses on these polarized identities to exaggerate perceptions of crisis among its 
‘in-group’. ISIS implements that by elevating the position of Sunnis in Iraq and using the harsh 
conditions of the Syrian war to demonstrate the harsh conditions ISIS opponents have to endure. 
This technique is used to keep the ‘in-group’ loyal and supportive. ISIS employed itself as the 
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protector of its ‘in-group’, and implores its members to care for and attend to Muslim Sunnis 
(Ingram, 2014). The group mainly frames itself as the agent of change, the main proponent of 
faith, and the defender of social justice (Farwell, 2014). On the other hand, ISIS uses the 
exaggerated identity of the ‘out-group’, such as that of the Shiites and the Western nations, to 
link with the perceptions of malaise and malevolence. After establishing the Caliphate, Abu Bakr 
Al-Baghdadi gave a speech where he claimed that the world is divided into two camps, and two 
camps only, “the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy,” 
(Ingram, 2014). According to Ingram, ISIS believes that there is only one solution to the current 
crisis, and that is the commitment to Islam and the elimination of any and all ‘out-group’ 
identities, and that national borders are a construct of Kufr or disbelief, and so Muslims must 
transnationally unite to confront this threat (Ingram, 2014).  
The second technique ISIS uses to maximize resonance is employing counter-narratives 
and vigorously confronting criticisms and accusations by its opponents, such as the accusation of 
ISIS not being a legitimate political project, of not having a political agenda, and of 
unnecessarily using violence, so as to reinforce its perceived legitimacy (Ingram, 2014). 
Finally, since it’s merely impossible to only target an isolated single audience, ISIS uses 
each message to act as both a promotional tool and a counter-narrative tool, thus targeting both 
‘friends’ and ‘foes’- the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’- simultaneously (Ingram, 2014). For 
example, when ISIS uses its media to promote the initiatives of its governance, this message 
would be designed to not only promote its political-administration capabilities, but also to 
counter the narratives set by its opponents accusing them of lacking a political agenda. When 
ISIS uses its media to disseminate photos and videos of brutal executions and torture, these 
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messages serve the purpose of not only terrorizing their opponents, but also forcing the support 
of civilians (Ingram, 2014). 
The second trait that describes ISIS’ media is its synchronization with politico-military 
action, a synchronization of narrative and action. ISIS uses its media not only to promote its 
successes, but also to use as a tool of psychological warfare preceding its military operations 
(Ingram, 2014). ISIS uses its Media as a tool to frame its ‘guerrilla-warfare’ politico-military 
activities. ISIS members flood social media with real-time videos, photos and reports of their 
conquests, they emphasize the brutality of their actions to uphold authority and to use coercion as 
a tool for civilian submission (Ingram, 2014). 
The third trait that ISIS’ media is based on is its centralization around the ISIS ‘brand’. 
This brand is a symbol of the narrative action ISIS is based on. This trait is best evidenced by 
ISIS’ name change. It went from being called Al tawhid wal Jihad, to being called ISI (The 
Islamic State in Iraq), to being called ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) to being called 
ISIL (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), to being called IS (The Islamic State). This name 
change has been brought out to formalize its relationships and maximize its successes and 
benefits. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi framed ISIS’ name changes as milestones in the evolution of the 
group and the rise of its authority (Ingram, 2014). These name changes, according to Ingram, 
were funded for the sake of the necessity of legitimacy, to match the group’s level of growth and 
pinnacle (Ingram, 2014). 
Aligning the group’s brand with its messages and actions is extremely important as it 
benefits the group in terrorizing its opponents, and as it leads to having global resonance 
(Ingram, 2014). 
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The group’s brand is a symbol of its entire campaign (Ingram, 2014). ISIS’ successes are a result 
of the cumulative impact of all three of its media traits, which is what sets it apart and gives it an 
advantage over all its predecessor and all its contemporaries.  
1.14: Dabiq 
"We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your 
women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted," Al-Adnani said. "If 
we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will 
reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market,” 
(Bacchi, 2014). 
 
 Dabiq is the official magazine released by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. ISIS 
describes Dabiq as "a periodical magazine focusing on the issues of tawhid (unity), manhaj 
(truth-seeking), hijrah (migration), jihad (holy war) and jama'ah (community). It will also 
contain photo reports, current events, and informative articles on matters relating to the Islamic 
State."(“The Clarion Project”, 2014).  The magazine is available only through various online 
sources. It is published in a number of different languages, including Arabic and English. The 
magazine discusses ISIS’ strategic direction, the political-military strategic plans, and their 
methods for recruiting fighters among other issues (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 2014). ISIS 
also uses Dabiq to boast of their successes in conquering more lands and in carrying out various 
attacks on the entities they deem as their enemies. Additionally, the magazine also discusses the 
atrocities committed by ISIS’ enemies (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 2014). 
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Dabiq is named after a small village in northern Syria, near the Turkish border, with no 
more than 4,000 inhabitants. However, the village of Dabiq, according to one reading of Islamic 
tradition, is where the crusaders finally meet the Muslim armies in a confrontation “between 
good and evil”, where the Muslims finally win and destroy the crusaders (Fraser, 2014). 
Dabiq frames the war against Islam as a “continuation of a battle of civilization”, rather 
than a singular event. It describes Westerners as modern day Romans and crusaders (McCoy, 
2014). 
The magazine is constructed to appeal to ISIS’ followers, and challenge its critics, to 
promote its successes, and to recruit new members transnationally (“The Jamestown 
Foundation”, 2014). 
In the magazine, ISIS uses very graphic portrayals of its violences against its opponents, 
especially the Shiites and the Westerners. However, one very strong element in the magazine is 
the usage of Quranic verses to justify the violent acts and legitimize the nature of the 
organization. This combination is believed and intended to capture and inspire young warriors 
into joining the group and fighting for the caliphate and for Islam (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 
2014). Dabiq is estimated to have magnetized at least 12,000 fighters from over 74 countries 
(McCoy, 2014). 
In its pages, Dabiq very violent images and wording. The magazine hosts picture of 
bloody corpses, demolished buildings and houses, and explicit beheadings. To maximize its 
magnetization, Dabiq uses very advanced graphics and slick images, a form of presentation that 
gives the illusion of a science fiction movie or a video game (McCoy, 2014). This form of 
literary brutality is a tool for recruitment. Dabiq, not only hosts very graphic and brutal images 
and content, but also calls for violence against ISIS’ opponents.  "Every Muslim should get out 
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of his house, find a crusader and kill him ... And the Islamic State will remain until its banner 
flies over Rome," (Bacchi, 2014). In one of its issues, Dabiq justified the killing of Yazidis and 
the selling and enslavement of their women and children. In the magazine, ISIS bragged about 
how it forced Yazidis into religious conversion, how it forced them into marriages, and how it 
forced them into sexual slavery (McDuffee, 2014). The magazine referred to Yazidis as ‘Pagans’ 
and ‘infidels’. ISIS uses Dabiq to threaten and intimidate its enemies. In one issue, ISIS 
spokesperson  Mohammed al-Adnani said, "We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, 
and enslave your women,"(McDuffee, 2014). 
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review 
3.1: Mass-mediated terrorism 
“When one says “terrorism” in a democratic society, one also says 
“media.” For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon 
which depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. This, in 
essence, is why terrorism and the media enjoy a symbiotic relationship,” 
(Weimann, 2008). 
Since realizing the potential of mass media in reaching global audiences, the media has 
been classified as a vital tool for terrorist organizations’ success and has been playing a very 
substantial role in the dissemination of terrorist messages. According to Weimann, without the 
media, terrorism can never successfully achieve its objectives (Weimann, 2008). 
Terrorism, by nature, is sensational and shocking, and therefore draws significant media 
attention (Powell, 2011). The existing literature seems to generally be in agreement with the idea 
that mass media has greatly emphasized the magnitude of terrorism (Weimann, 2008; Eid, 2013; 
Nacos, 2003; Powell, 2011). Eid and Nacos discuss how terrorism is no longer concerned with 
the act of harming a single individual or a small group, but now it focuses on exploiting the 
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media for attention and publicity; it went beyond the confines of violence and has become a 
spectacle (Eid, 2013; Nacos, 2003). Nacos explains that the obsession of American media with 
the sensationalization of violence has led American news media to transform terrorist activity 
and violence into an entertainment spectacle (Nacos, 2003). This has, not only, largely 
contributed to the dependence of terrorists on media coverage, but also led terrorists to tailor 
attacks to suit media coverage and to gain greater attention. Weimann states that terrorists 
provide visual aids, video tapes, films, press releases, and taped interviews for the media to use 
substantially, and as a way of directly and indirectly feeding the media with their own material 
for propaganda (Weimann, 2008).  
Not only do terrorist organizations feed the media with their material, but they also 
operate their own media and disseminate their own information, messages, and multimedia. They 
operate a plethora of media platforms ranging from websites and online forums, to magazines, 
television stations, radio channels, newspapers and even news agencies (Weimann, 2008). 
Media organizations and governments started adopting several methods to try and limit 
this dissemination of excruciatingly dangerous messages, some of these methods include limiting 
terrorists’ access to conventional media platforms, censoring and reducing news coverage of 
terrorist acts, and attempting to minimize terrorists’ manipulation of the media (Weimann, 2008). 
However, according to Weimann, computer-mediated communication and the Internet have 
facilitated the mediation of terrorist messages and are the ideal platforms for terrorist 
organizations to take advantage of (Weimann, 2008).  
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3.2: Internet and Terrorism  
As a means of further increasing their reach to include global audiences and 
governments, terrorist organizations started relying on computer-mediated communications and 
the Internet (Klausen, 2015; Weimann 2008; Wright, et al., 2015; Neumann, 2013). Their 
presence on cyberspace ranges from website and online forums, to chat rooms, online 
publications and social media profiles. From 1998 till 2006, the number of terrorist websites 
grew from just a dozen to more than 5,300 websites. Today all terrorist organizations have and 
maintain more than one website, and even operate them in different languages (Weimann, 2008). 
The Internet has changed the landscape of terrorism.  Wright and Bachmann argue that the 
Internet created a forum for “virtual jihad” making it much easier and much faster for terrorists 
to disseminate messages, recruit fighters, communicate with each other, and incite fear (Wright, 
et al., 2015; Klausen, 2015; Neumann, 2013). Klausen argued that the Internet has eliminated the 
terrorists’ dependencies on mainstream media, and in turn, caused mainstream media to be 
dependent on terrorist-run media (Klausen, 2015). 
Weimann quoted Al Qaeda leader Al Baghdadi saying, “we strongly urge Muslim 
Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the jihad through e-
mail lists, discussion groups and their own Web sites. The more Web sites, the better it is for us. 
We must make the Internet our tool,” (Weimann, 2008). 
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The Internet is very advantageous to terrorists. It is the ideal environment for them to 
spread their messages of violence and hate, to communicate with each other and establish their 
intranet, to communicate with their supporters, and most importantly, to launch a psychological 
warfare against their opponents (Weimann, 2008). Klausen states that not only is the Internet 
vital for the processes of terrorist propaganda, but it also allows them to fully control the 
messages rather than leave them in the hands of mainstream media (Klausen, 2015). One of the 
advantages of the Internet is that it is not constrained by geographical boundaries, and it is not 
financially or politically dependent on any particular state or government, thus making it much 
easier for terrorists to navigate through to their audiences (Weimann, 2008). The Internet is 
decentralized, and therefore not subjected to restrictions or control, and most importantly, the 
Internet is uncensored- a very important trait for terrorists as they tend to disseminate extremely 
graphic and dangerous material. The Internet also allows access to anyone, anywhere, and when 
taking the right precautions, allows anonymity. 
According to Weimann, terrorists target three types of audiences online: current and 
potential supporters, the international communities, and their enemies. For their supporters they 
update them with their latest news, conquests, attacks, activities, and internal and foreign 
political news. They also offer them propagandist merchandise for sale, printed shirts, flags and 
badges with slogans and logos, as well as video tapes and audio cassettes. For the international 
bystander audience and web surfers, they offer them historical information and backgrounds, 
international reports, and press releases. A vital sector of this audience is international journalists 
who scour these websites for information, material and press releases. As for their third target 
audience, the enemy, they provide them with material to demoralize and scare them, and material 
to create feelings of guilt for the sufferings of victims. They post very graphic and frightening 
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material, such as footages of executions, beheadings, mass murders, snipers, bombings, and 
wreckages. They also deliver messages that contain threats to their enemies (Weimann, 2008). 
Even though most of the existing literature suggests that the Internet was extremely 
advantageous to terrorists (Wright, et al., 2015; Klausen, 2015; Neumann, 2013; Weimann, 
2008; Eid 2013), Nacos argues that a direct positive correlation has not been scientifically 
proven between the rise of internet terrorist activity and terrorist violence, however, she suggests 
that it is logical to assume a positive relationship between the two variables (Nacos, 2003; Eid, 
2013). 
3.3: Cyberterrorism 
“The traditional view of war has changed from an empirical and a theoretical viewpoint. 
We progressively move from hard to soft powers,” (Durante, 2014). The development of digital 
technology and cyberspace has immensely changed modern-day activities. But with this change, 
comes the opportunity for cyberterrorism (Grabosky, 2007). War, Durante argues, has evolved to 
not only depend on physical kinetic armed attacks, but also on exploiting national political, 
ideological, economic and informational resources (Durante, 2014; Grabosky, 2007). 
 
Cyberterrorism is the merging of terrorism and cyberspace through the usage of 
computers and networks to attack information systems for the sake of intimidating or coercing 
governments, entities or civil populations to achieve political, social, ideological or religious 
objectives, and to sabotage critical national infrastructures supported by computer networks and 
computer-based systems (Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Abeyratne, 2011; Durante, 2014; 
Ahmed, et al., 2015; Grabosky, 2007). Cyber terrorist attacks could be conducted anonymously 
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and remotely allowing the hacker to obliterate any traces leading back to them. They are low-
budget attacks that only require the usage of computer networks and programming to interfere 
with a state’s activities, security and stability (Stohl, 2007; Abeyratne, 2011; Frank et al., 2015). 
Abeyratne defines cyberterrorist attacks as assaults on electronic communications networks. 
Cyberterrorist attacks are conducted by non-state actors, subnational groups or clandestine agents 
(Abeyratne, 2011; Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Durante, 2014; Frank et al., 2015) 
 
Cyberterrorism shows that terrorist attacks may not only be confined to physical domain, 
but may also target informational and virtual domains (Stevens, 2013). 
 
Several authors argue that cyberterrorism could potentially cause immeasurable harm in 
domestic and global governance and security by interfering with major information systems in 
banking, finance, government services, healthcare, religion, transportation, aerospace and air 
traffic control,  telecommunications, electricity and military bases among other systems 
(Abeyratne, 2011;  Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Lu et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2015; Grabosky, 
2007). Moreover, this puts more strain on the governments’ abilities to perform their duties, 
especially when having to deal with an enemy that is no longer a physical, identifiable entity, but 
one that comprises non-state actors dispersed in a virtual space (Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; 
Stevens, 2013; Lu et al., 2010).  
 
Stohl argues that for an attack to qualify as a cyberterrorist attack, it should cause 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear, for instance 
attacks that cause bodily harm, death, explosions, plane crashes, or severe economic losses. They 
should be destructive enough to generate fear and loss similar to that of a traditional terrorist 
attack (Stohl, 2007). They might also potentially cause harm to other stakeholders in the state 
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such as businesses, citizens and relevant international players (Pawlack and Wendling, 2013). 
Some authors argue that cyberattacks are expected to increase and become more intrusive which 
might eventually lead to tensions between states and even ‘cyberwars’ (Pawlack and Wendling, 
2013; Abeyratne, 2011; Grabosky, 2007; Stevens, 2013; Lu et al., 2010). 
 
A substantial part of the literature, on the other hand, agrees that there have been no 
reported instances where cyberterrorism has caused catastrophic losses, physical damage or loss 
of life similar to that of traditional terrorist attacks, and that cyberterrorism fails to rise to the 
level of warfare (Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Durante, 2014; Lewis, 2003). Stohl argues that 
while most terrorist events involve large numbers of deaths and enormous property damage, 
cyberterrorist attacks do not seem to pose threats as imminent as those of traditional methods of 
terrorism (Stohl, 2007) Similarly, Helms argues that cyberterrorist attacks are less effective and 
less destructive than traditional physical terrorist attacks, and describes the usage of computer 
networks and cyberspace as “weapons of mass annoyance” (Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2002; 
Lewis, 2003). They are no more than annoying acts that merely require mitigating the digital 
damage they cause and re-establishing system functionality (Lewis, 2002). The only advantage 
to cyberterrorist attacks, Helms argues, is that they are easier to carry out and cheaper than 
physical attacks, however, they are much less effective (Helms et al., 2012). Helms and Lewis 
argue that due to the very small number of cyberattacks, which in no way are comparable to 
traditional physical terrorist acts, and were not successful in widely spreading fear, cyberattacks 
should not be classified as acts of terrorism. Durante argues that the effects of cyberterrorism are 
usually non-physical damages, and that using the term cyberterrorism is a stretch of the 
magnitude and the effect of computer-mediated attacks (Durante, 2014). Lewis argues that the 
connection between physical and cyber terrorism seldom exists, and that hackers cannot fly 
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planes and detonate bombs, but the most damage they can do is to gain access to valuable 
information, which could lead to espionage and the theft of financial and intellectual data (Lewis, 
2003). The authors argue that the media’s alarmist claims and predictions of “an electronic Pearl 
Harbour” are highly exaggerated (Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2003). 
 
Despite the reality that cyberterrorism may not pose a potential physical threat, we are 
constantly reminded by the media of our vulnerability to cyberterrorist attacks, moreover, cyber 
terrorism is constantly being given tremendous attention and propaganda by the media and by 
governments which ultimately generates unwarranted fear and public anxiety of potential attacks 
(Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2003).  
 
3.4: The Theatre of Terror 
“Kill one- frighten ten thousand,”-Chinese proverb, (Prunchken, 2014). 
The word terrorism originated from the Latin word Terrere, which means to frighten. The 
reign of terror started in 1793 during the French revolution, when 17,000 individuals were 
publicly executed before mass audiences in an attempt to instill fear in the French citizens.  
Research on the concept of theatre of terror relies heavily on Gabriel Weimann, perhaps 
the largest contributor to the research of that field. Weimann coined the term theatre-of-terror 
referring to the usage of methods of orchestrated violence to communicate terrorists’ messages 
(Weimann, 2008). Modern terrorist groups have realized the potential of mass-mediated 
terrorism, and thus have found it more alluring to perform their acts of violence on television for 
the whole world to see, rather than to just remain hidden guerrillas in the bush. They very 
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carefully choreograph terrorist attacks to attract media attention; they take hostages to elevate the 
element of drama; they plan their work very carefully and they make sure every step of the way 
is publicized (Weimann, 2008; Jenkins, 1975).  
The target audience, Jenkins argues, is the people watching, not the actual victims. 
(Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 2008). The victims are not chosen because they are enemies, they are 
merely chosen for their symbolic importance (Klausen, 2015; Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 2008). 
Jenkins, Weimann and Klausen stated that modern acts of terrorism require theatrical production 
elements such as scripts, casts, sets, props and stage management, as well as great attention to 
detail, in order to be effective and to achieve their targets (Klausen, 2015; Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 
2008). This modern form of terrorism has become a means for persuasion and psychological 
warfare (Weimann, 2008). Prunckun explained that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, 
and that modern terrorist acts go beyond the immediate harm of the victim, but rather aim to 
frighten thousands (Prunckun, 2014). This new form of terrorism is achieved through the use of 
mediated, orchestrated symbolic violence, which the literature suggests has a much larger and 
amplified effect (Prunckun, 2014; Hoffmann, 2006; Weimann, 2008; Nacos, 2003; Menkhaus, 
2014).  
Weimann and Nacos both argue that the most violent performance of  theatrical terror is 
the September 911 attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center. These attacks were 
perfectly choreographed to attract the attention of American and international audiences. The 
bigger the spectacle, the wider the reach. To heighten the publicity for their attacks, terrorists, on 
most occasions, choose sentimental Landmarks as locations for their attacks as their destruction 
would bring about international publicity (Nacos, 2003;Weimann, 2008). 
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These attacks introduced a newer and more advanced level of mass-mediated terrorism. 
The planners of the attack very carefully organized the method, the targets, the timing, and the 
scope of the attacks (Weimann, 2008; Woods, 2011). The 911 attacks succeeded in capturing the 
whole world’s attention. The planners of the attack set America’s public agenda for years and 
opinion polls revealed that 99% of all Americans were following the news related to terrorist 
attacks (be it on television, radio, or the Internet), and that these attacks heightened fear in 
Americans, fear of themselves or of a family member being the victim of a similar attack. The 
September 11 attacks broke the record as the most watched terrorist spectacle of all time 
(Weimann, 2008).  
These attacks brought the world into a new age of what Weimann labels as mega-
terrorism. This new era of mega-terrorism, relies on the media to take care of the spreading of 
terrorist messages, and is the most powerfully media-oriented era in terrorism yet (Weimann, 
2008). Following the attacks, Bin Laden said: “There is America, full of fear from north to south, 
from west to east. Thank God for that,” (Weimann, 2008). 
In fact, not only do terrorists choreograph their acts to make spectacles out of this, but 
they also tailor their attacks to suit the media and the media’s convenience, to allow for the most 
amount of coverage possible. Klausen, Weimann and Prunckun argue that according to the 
preferences of the media, terrorists select their targets, timings, and locations, and try to meet the 
criteria for newsworthiness, media deadlines, and schedules. In most cases, analysts suggest, 
every terrorist act includes at least a cameraman, a soundman, a producer, and the perpetrator 
(Weimann, 2008; Prunckun, 2014; Klausen, 2015).  
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3.5: Inspire, Azan and Dabiq-  
 
Al-Qaeda’s Inspire, Taliban’s Azan, and ISIS’ Dabiq are three English-language 
magazines, which are also published in a number of different languages that are designed to 
disseminate their groups’ messages. All three of these magazines are produced at a very high 
quality, they enjoy a very slick design, a Western stylish format, and very captivating content 
(Kirke, 2014; Lemieux, et al., 2014; Ingram, 2015). These three magazines have a common set 
of objectives: to recruit fighters to their groups, to gain supporters, to communicate with the 
global audiences (hence the different languages they’re published in), to provide material for the 
media, and to assemble a unified identity (Ingram, 2015; Kirke, 2014; Lemieux, et al., 2014; 
Sivek, 2013; Fraser, 2014; Bacchi, 2014) However, there is a research gap in the literature when 
it comes to content analyses of terrorist-produced media, Dabiq in particular, and the 
psychological elements in the publication and in its rhetoric.   
 
3.6: A unified identity- 
 
Menkhaus suggests that Al Qaeda, through longitudinal observation, has devoted its 
objectives to transforming the Islamic identity and worldviews about Islam, and to bringing 
together the Muslim Ummah, or community (Menkhaus, 2014). On the other hand, the literature 
suggests that ISIS has also been seeking the same objective. Fromson and Simon stated that ISIS 
has been founding their own caliphate to bring together the muslim Ummah and to reunite 
Muslims under one collective identity (Fromson, et al., 2015; Al-Ibrahim, 2015; Turner, 2015; 
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Hashim, 2014). One of the main ways that these publications attempt to assemble a unified 
identity is the emphasis they put on one’s belonging to the in-group and the out-group (Ingram, 
2015; Ingram, 2014; Menkhaus, 2014). Kirke states that Inspire aims at creating this unified 
identity by both encouraging and driving their audiences to take part in the in-group and 
participate in and defend the Ummah, or risk being labeled as part of the out-group and the 
enemy (Kirke, 2015). This is perhaps ISIS’ main objective, which the group boasted about on the 
front page of it’s first Dabiq issue.  Al-Ibrahim suggests that ISIS developed this concept of the 
Caliphate to call for exponential expansion, the ruling of all Muslims, and to unite all Muslims 
under one identity (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). However, one of the main research gaps in the literature 
is the lack of studies that examine the ways in which terrorist groups attempt to instill these 
concepts of a shared identity in their audiences through their own produced media.  
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework 
For the purpose of this study, two theories will be used to examine the content of the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s magazine Dabiq. The theory of framing, and the theory of 
selective moral disengagement. The theory of framing is best suited for this study as it allows the 
researcher to gain insight of the ways in which the organization, ISIS, encodes and shares its 
motives through the use of this mass mediated publication. The theory of selective moral 
disengagement allows the researcher to examine the rhetoric used by the organization in their 
media, and the psychology behind this rhetoric. This theory is vital for the understanding of the 
ways in which ISIS uses Dabiq to recruit fighters, and to turn normal citizens into ruthless killing 
machines. 
4.1: The Theory of Framing 
Framing is the practice of selecting aspects of perceived realities and making them more 
salient in order to promote specific problem definitions, moral evaluations, causal interpretations, 
and/or recommended treatments for that issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). A frame is a “central 
organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to events related to an issue” (Pan, et al., 
1993). Frames enable audiences to process large quantities of information routinely and quickly. 
They also help individuals package this information they perceived in an efficient manner for 
prompt retrieval of the information in the future (Pan, et al., 1993). According to Pan, frames are 
cognitive devices that are used to encode, interpret and retrieve information. They are activated 
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using five devices: “metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images” (Pan, et 
al., 1993). 
Frames allow audiences to dissect and perceive an issue in very specific manners using 
culture-based connotations that are linked to their familiar and existing norms, values, beliefs 
and attitudes (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).  
Frames are defined by Gitlin as “persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion” (Gitlin, 1980). 
Frames have substantial power in influencing people’s beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes, and can 
affect audiences’ treatment of a certain issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).  
 The origins of the theory of framing can be traced back to psychological and sociological 
approaches (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). The Sociological roots of framing are considered to be 
more macro-level. This approach describes frames as being “relatively stable and socially shared 
category systems” that individuals heuristically refer to when classifying new information 
(Tewksbury, et al., 2009). In this approach, individuals process complex information using 
causal attribution, or the link between the observed behavior and its potential cause. The 
psychological roots of framing are considered to be more micro-level and are associated with the 
individual’s cognitive processing (Pan, et al., 1993), where the individual would reflect upon a 
frame using their own judgments and perceptions. And where framing messages in multiple 
ways can inflict different interpretive schemas according to the individual on the receiving end of 
the information (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).  
The theory of framing suggests that audiences are generally unaware of the presence of 
frames, which in most cases is the reason why frames can generate strong effects (Tewksbury, et 
al., 2009). Not only do frames influence people’s judgments, but they also influence their 
inference construction (Pan, et al., 1993). Framing affects how the issue can be perceived and 
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understood, and therefore influences people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors towards certain 
issues (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). Framing affects how individuals prioritize values relating to 
issues, shaping the audience’s views, and attitudes about strategies and interior and foreign 
issues. Framing has the power to shape and change the audience's mindset, which can ultimately 
induce the audience’s support (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). When conducting research on framing 
as a dependent variable, researchers focus on frame creation and frame building as well as their 
adoption by their audiences, however, when studying framing as an independent variable, 
researchers focus on frame setting and the framing effects on audiences (Tewksbury, et al., 
2009).  
ISIS frames itself publicly as the harbinger or the bringer of the apocalypse, an ideology 
that has a very strong appeal to jihadists (Fromson, et al., 2015). It’s members read and interpret 
the Quran in way to feed and suit their ideology and agenda. Part of its apocalyptic prophecy are 
two main defining strategies: the establishment of the caliphate, and the annihilation of its 
sectarian opponents (Fromson, et al., 2015). 
ISIS exploits troubling situations and political unrest to feign an environment of security 
under its rule, and to promote its ability to protect the citizens and bring them to an era of peace 
and security, and to highlight the group’s value and strength, in order to gain supporters and keep 
the loyalty of its existing backers. ISIS also tries to demonstrate that it has the power to take the 
rule from the hands of existing political actors, who themselves pose greater threat to the people 
(Kfir, 2015). Kfir argues that every social group needs a strong bond to hold it together and, to 
ISIS, religion acts as that bond. This religious bond enables its promoter, ISIS, to come up with 
radical interpretations to manipulate the people, while framing itself as the bringer of peace and 
security (Kfir, 2015).   
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Framing can have a great effect on audience perception. With great events comes huge 
media coverage, bringing about preconstructed frames that affect the public’s 
perceptions.  Literature on the matter suggests that the situation after the attacks of 911 and the 
media coverage which brought about major changes in social attitude concerning issues such as 
support of anti-terrorism tactics, presidential approval, increased support for military action, and 
negative attitudes towards, Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants (Woods, 2011; Powell, 
2011).  During this period, the most dominant frames being used by politicians and the media 
were “the terrorist threat” and “the war on terror”. Terrorism shifted from being one minor 
concern, to being a “war on terror” (Powell, 2011; Woods, 2011). 
In his study, Woods identifies three main frames for terrorism: The “Terrorism” frame, 
the “Radical Islamic” frame, and the “nuclear” frame (Woods, 2011). Woods argues that using 
the “terrorism” frame for labelling a violent act in itself primes people’s concerns about danger 
and influences their assumptions, when in fact, depending on different schemes, a violent act can 
be labeled as a “crime” or a “struggle for freedom”. The second frame is the “radical Islamic” 
frame, which according to Woods can be very influential because it goes a step further than 
terrorism and provides a diagnostic component to why these violent acts took place. The third 
frame, the “nuclear” frame, Woods argues accentuates high-threat and would likely trigger high-
levels of fear. Woods findings show that the way terrorism is framed affects people’s perceptions 
of the terrorist threat (Woods, 2011). 
In her study, Powell argues that the tactics Bush used after 911 to win the support of the 
American people were the starting point of a rivalry between the Americans versus the Arabs, 
the West versus the East, the Us versus Them (Powell, 2011). Powell’s study revealed a framing 
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pattern whereby fear of international organized Islamist terrorism against the “Christian 
America” is exponentially heightened. 
Powell conducted a content analysis of the coverage of terrorism in six major news 
outlets- The New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News. 
The content analysis highlighted five themes in terrorism coverage: naming/ labeling of the 
terror suspect (such as terrorist or Muslim), assigning adjectives/ descriptors to the agent (using 
adjectives such as angry, extremist), highlighting a motive for the act (revenge, killing), 
portraying victims (using adjectives such as good, innocent and hero), and highlighting 
possibilities of future threat (heightening the level of threat and fear, making (Powell, 2011). 
Powell argues that terrorism is framed as a problem associated mainly with Islam, as opposed to 
domestic terrorism which is framed as less threatening and as one-time cases (Powell, 2011). 
Brinson and Stohl studied terrorism framing in the media, especially after the events of 
July 7, 2005, the bombings that hit London’s subway system. They analyzed two specific frames 
and their effects on audience perceptions of fear, attitudes towards Muslims, and the citizens’ 
willingness to decrease their civil liberties in support of government action. The two frames 
being studied were the domestic frame, referring homegrown terrorism, and the international 
frame, referring to terrorist acts committed by international terrorist organizations (Brinson and 
Stohl, 2012). 
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4.2: The Theory of Selective Moral Disengagement    
“Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can do extraordinarily cruel 
things,” (Bandura, 2002). 
For terrorist organizations to be able to recruit normal citizens and turn them into fighters 
who commit the most atrocious crimes, these new recruits start adopting mechanisms for moral 
disengagement to allow them to inflict harm in others. People can’t turn cruel overnight, but with 
moral disengagement practices, they can start performing mildly harmful deeds that they can 
tolerate performing, and then gradually move onto the more atrocious acts with little regard to 
their own anguish or self-censure; committing abhorrent terrorist acts just become everyday 
chores and duties (Bandura, 2002). 
Selective moral disengagement is perhaps one of the most useful tools for the analyzing 
and the studying of terrorist rhetoric. Albert Bandura, a psychologist and leading researcher in 
the social cognitive theory and the theory of selective moral disengagement, argues that the 
moral agency is manifested in the power to refrain from acting inhumanely and the power to act 
humanely. Moral agency, according to Bandura, links moral reasoning and knowledge with 
moral conduct and behavior. With the presence of this moral agency, individuals develop their 
moral self, they adopt standards of wrong and right to serve as guides for their behavior, and they 
self-regulate themselves, where they monitor their conduct and judge it based on their moral 
standards, and thus subsequently regulate their conduct and actions. This process gives 
individuals self-worth, satisfaction and brings about positive self-sanctions. It makes them 
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refrain from behaving in manners that contradict their moral standards, so as not to bring about 
self-condemnation or negative self-sanctions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). 
Morality and self-regulatory mechanisms, however, do not automatically function unless 
they’re willingly activated, and there are psychosocial maneuvers used in which individuals 
could disengage their moral self-sanctions, and therefore allowing the individual to commit 
inhumane acts. One person with the same moral standards, through either selective activation of 
morality or moral disengagement, can behave in either a humane or an inhumane manner 
(Bandura, 2002). 
Weimann argues that, based on Bandura’s theory, terrorists operate their inhumane and atrocious 
acts of violence by exercising moral disengagement (Weimann, 2008). In order to exercise moral 
disengagement, Bandura’s theory suggests a set of seven disengagement practices- 
4.2.1: Moral Justification  
People usually do not conduct inhumane or harmful actions unless they have justified 
them first, and thus, over the centuries, according to Weimann and Bandura, people have been 
exercising moral disengagement in order to justify their harmful conduct using socially worthy 
and moral purposes. This gives individuals the freedom to conduct atrocious acts while viewing 
themselves as moral agents. People have conducted destructive actions in the name of religious 
principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalist imperatives. Combatants sanctify their 
aggressive actions but condemn the actions of their opponents as brutal and barbaric 
masquerading under a facade of outrageous moral reasoning, while each side feels moral 
superiority over the other (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  
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When recruiting fighters, whether to fight for national armies or for terrorist 
organizations, rapid radical shifts in behavior must take place in order to promote these, once 
normal, civilians to fight and kill. This is not achieved by altering the structures of their 
personalities, their moral standards, or their aggressive drives, but by cognitively reasoning and 
moralizing the act of killing through moral justification. This allows people to view themselves 
as combating oppression, protecting the weak, honoring their countries, and saving humanity. 
Bandura quotes Voltaire saying: “Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you 
commit atrocities,” (Bandura, 2002). 
In the case of religious terrorists, they twist theology to view themselves as carrying out 
God’s will and serving a holy imperative. They mount their jihad on the notion that they’re 
fighting and decontaminating the world from infidels. “God’s law positively requires us to 
defend helpless people. God has used people, who are willing to die for their cause to save 
human life.” (Bandura, 2002). 
4.2.2: Euphemistic Labelling 
An action can be perceived much differently depending on the way it was labeled. 
Euphemistic language is the usage of respectable terms to label harmful conduct in order to 
reduce personal responsibility. It is a very injurious rhetorical weapon. Bandura argues that 
people behave more aggressively when their assaultive doings are given sanitized labels, rather 
than aggressive labels.   
 One form of euphemism is sanitizing language. This form makes even the most 
repugnant actions seem like everyday chores. Soldiers “waste” people instead of kill them. 
Bombs “service targets”, attacks are “clean”, civilians bombed are regarded as “collateral 
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damage”, people losing their jobs are given “career alternative enhancements”, and nuclear 
mishap explosions become “energetic disassembles”. 
 The other form of euphemism is the agentless passive voice. This form of rhetoric makes 
reprehensible acts appear as if they are works of nameless forces, and not people, and as if 
people were mechanically moved, and did not act by their own will. Sometimes even inanimate 
objects are turned into agents (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  For example, “the tank 
approached and struck the whole town.” Even specialized jargon can be misused to frame things 
differently. During Nixon’s administration, for example, criminal conspiracy turned into “game 
plan” and conspirators turned into merely “team players,” (Bandura, 2002). Al Qaeda always 
referred to the 911 attack as an attack on symbols of American power, wealth and consumerism, 
it never referred to 911 as the killing of over 3,000 people (Weimann, 2008). This type of 
rhetoric allows conduct to be perceived as respectable and mild.       
4.2.3: Advantageous Comparison 
The contrast between the way behavior is perceived and what it is compared with can 
make reprehensible acts seem righteous. The worse the contrasting inhumanities are, the more 
mild and benevolent one’s destructive conduct will seem. Terrorists’ behavior is viewed as self-
martyrdom when compared to the cruelty of their enemies. The American military’s mass 
destruction of Vietnam was downsized when describing the American intervention as saving 
Vietnam from the communist enslavement (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). In Egypt, the 
economic and political instabilities that took place in the years following the January 25 
revolution are minimized by the government when comparing to the Syrian state’s affairs during 
its civil war.   
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In this form of rhetoric, making violence morally acceptable is made easier by two sets of 
judgments, the non-violent options framed to be ineffective, and the violent options that would 
later prevent more suffering (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).      
4.2.4: Displacement of Responsibility 
“Through the jihad, they are carrying out Allah’s will as a “religious duty.” The prime agency for 
the holy terror is displaced to Allah,” (Weimann, 2008).  
Moral control strongly operates when individuals know they’re responsible for the harm 
of others, however by minimizing and obscuring one’s agentive role, moral disengagement takes 
over. Bandura argues that people will behave in atrocious ways when a legitimate authority 
claims responsibility for their conduct. Therefore, with displaced responsibility, one’s actions are 
dictates of authorities rather than one’s own conduct, thus sparing the individual their self-
condemning reactions. Authorities explicitly give out orders and authorize explicit injurious 
actions, and claim full responsibility for them. The greater the legitimization of the authority, the 
higher the level of obedience aggression will be (Bandura, 2002).     
Through displacement of responsibility, self-exemption from great and mass inhumane 
acts is revealed in the most gruesome mass executions, where individuals claim they were 
merely carrying out orders, such as the Nazi Holocaust, military atrocities, and terrorist attacks.  
4.2.5: Diffusion of Responsibility 
“Where everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible,” (Bandura, 2002). 
Diffusion of responsibility is the act of making group decisions, dividing labor, and taking 
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collective action, and thus weakening personal agency and moral control. In this case, people 
shift their attention from what they’re specifically doing, to what their job description asks of 
them. By diffusing responsibility for injurious behavior, the personal agency is obscured, and the 
subdivided tasks every individual is responsible for seem harmless on their own. Bandura argues 
that people act more violently under a group than when they are holding themselves accountable 
for their actions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  
4.2.6: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences 
Weakening moral control can also operate by minimizing, distorting, or disregarding the 
effects and the harms caused by one’s actions. When carrying out inhumane activities, 
individuals tend to avoid facing the harm they’re causing. To keep self-censure deactivated, the 
harmful results from one’s inhumane doings must be minimized, distorted, minimized, or 
disbelieved; when the suffering is invisible, it becomes much easier to inflict harm (Bandura, 
2002; Bandura, 1996).  Due to the advancement of death technologies, in an era where mass 
destruction happens at the click of a button, or a laser-controlled system, faceless electronic 
warfare makes it much easier to depersonalize and disregard the inhumanity of one’s actions. 
However, when people can see and hear the harm and suffering they’re causing, they become 
self-restrained, self-censured, and distressed (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). 
 Based on Milgram’s experiments, Bandura suggests that individuals are much less 
compliant to commit injurious commands and less obedient to the authority commanding when 
the pain and suffering of victims become personalized and evident (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 
1996).    
 During the Vietnamese war, a single photograph of a little girl with burnt off clothes near 
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the rubble of her destructed town rose so much public debate and turned the American public 
against the government and the war. Nowadays, the American military bans all cameras and 
journalists from the battlefield to censor, and prevent the dissemination of, disturbing images and 
graphic content that could obliterate public support in international disputes (Bandura, 2002).  
4.2.7: Dehumanization 
The strength and activation of moral control depends on the ways in which the 
perpetrators see their victims. Seeing their victims as humans, because of perceived similarity, 
activates empathetic reactions; identifying with one whom an individual is similar to, makes the 
victim’s suffering and pain more arousing than that of a being not similar to one’s self (Bandura, 
2002; Bandura, 1996). Thus, it becomes a very difficult task, which usually cannot happen 
without the causal of distress and self-condemnation to the perpetrator, to inflict pain and 
suffering on one with human qualities. To be able to deal with that, perpetrators resort to 
stripping victims of their human qualities and dehumanizing them. Once this happens, one can 
inflict pain upon them without taking into considerations their feelings, concerns, hopes, or 
families. The victims are merely regarded as sub-human objects, mindless savages, and 
unfortunate creatures. If dehumanizing the victims isn’t enough to weaken self-censure, 
perpetrators attribute demonic and beastial qualities to them, visualizing them as low animal 
forms and satanic creatures (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). The combined effect of 
dehumanizing and diffusion of responsibility makes it much easier to kill one’s victims 
(Bandura, 2002). In the act of dehumanization, perpetrators become power holders who devalue 
those they wield control over and have little desire to identify or associate with them, and thus 
they treat them in the most violent ways (Bandura, 2002). 
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On terrorist websites, all these methods can be used to justify the use of violence, which 
is framed as a necessity, and as the only way possible to deal with the opponents. Terrorist 
rhetoric tries to send a mixture of messages of love, peace and support, whereby terrorist 
organizations frame themselves as victims who were forced to resort to violence to save 
humanity and Islam from the face of the merciless and brutal enemies (Weimann, 2008).  
4.3: The exercise of moral disengagement in modern day history- 
Bandura’s theory argues that moral disengagement is a process where violence and 
aggression are perceived to be justifiable, and where individuals cease to consider or apply 
fairness in treatment among themselves (Bandura, 2002; Greenhalgh, et al., 2015; Kyriacou and 
Zuin, 2016) Kyriacou and Zuin used Bandura’s theory to analyze the relationship between 
cyberbullying and the moral disengagement of the bullies who practice it. They explain moral 
disengagement as the desensitization of emotional empathy and values towards victims, whereby 
the morally disengaged individuals consciously do not allow themselves to envision or feel their 
victims’ pains, thus allowing themselves to continue carrying out their practices (Kyriacou and 
Zuin, 2016). The authors state that moral disengagement has already previously been indicated to 
be a common characteristic among bullies, and argue that it goes hand-in-hand with 
cyberbullying (Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016). The authors argue that, in cyberbullying, the distance 
between the victim and the target, since the bullying occurs online rather than face-to-face, 
facilitates the process of moral disengagement and makes cyberbullies much less likely to 
develop feelings of empathy towards their victims (Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016). 
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Moreover, with the growing number of refugees seeking asylum in various countries 
around the world, the Australian government, in an attempt to limit the amount of asylum 
seekers going into the country, started to deter and indefinitely detain refugees reaching Australia 
by sea. In their study, Greenhalgh, Watt and Schutte suggest that, in this situation, mechanisms 
of moral disengagement were at play, particularly among Australian citizens who endorsed the 
government’s policies, (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015). Australian citizens heavily supported the 
government’s actions, even though these actions were known to result in human loss and 
suffering.  The government forced refugee boats to turn back, forced them to return to their 
origins, and indefinitely detained them in remote locations (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015). 
Greenhalgh, Watt and Schutte’s study aimed at exploring how mechanisms of moral 
disengagement aided in the increased population’s support of the Australian government 
(Greenhalgh, et al., 2015).    
Moral disengagement can also occur among well-educated elites. There are numerous 
cases that took place concerning unethical business and science practices, some of which resulted 
in environmental destruction, financial loss, and even preventable deaths (Cory, 2015). For 
example, the accounting scandals that lead to the financial crises of the years 2000 and 2008, the 
2010 explosion of the oil drilling rig in Mexico, which resulted in the killing of 11 crewmen and 
the spilling of 210 million oil gallons in the Gulf, and the epitome of unethical professional 
practices, according to Cory, was the designing of the Nazi gas chambers that resulted in the 
killing of millions of Jews (Cory, 2015). In her study, Cory examined undergraduate students in 
business and science majors in aims of understanding their ethical inclinations pertaining to 
Bandura’s moral disengagement theory. Cory argues that business and science students are more 
susceptible to moral disengagement given their eventual employment opportunities and the 
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ability to harm the physical or financial welfare of others (Cory, 2015). One major finding from 
Cory’s study was that males exhibited higher tendencies for moral disengagement than females 
(Cory, 2015).  
The theory of moral disengagement offers a conceptual approach to developing 
education-based prevention strategies. Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky study a new program, named 
Beyond Bali, designed to equip young students and make them unsusceptible to moral 
disengagement, in an effort to combat terrorism recruitment and violent extremism through 
education. The program teaches students about the Bali bombings of 2002 and their impact, 
while exploring the students’ own assumptions, values, and morals. Through Beyond Bali, the 
students learn to consciously activate their self-regulatory moral agency mechanisms and thus 
immunizing themselves against efforts of moral disengagement in violent extremism. The 
program was designed in Australia for school students to build cognitive resilience to the efforts 
and mechanisms of violent extremism and terrorism. This program helps students absorb self-
sanctions and prepares them to confront any influences or attempts carried out by extremists that 
may lead to moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014).  Beyond Bali is founded on Bandura’s 
theory of moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014). The authors argue that moral education has 
the potential to prevent radicalization by reinforcing one’s loyalty to moral standards and by 
countering attempts of moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014). Through a qualitative study of 
the program, the authors reached a conclusion that the program was successful in developing 
self-efficacy in resisting influences of extremism, building resilience, constructing violent 
extremism as inhumane and unjust, developing feelings of empathy with terrorism victims, and 
considering the devastating consequences of terrorism (Aly, et al., 2014).  
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
 
This research analyzes the ways in which the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria uses Dabiq to 
disseminate their messages, to spread terror, and to gain followers and recruits. The research is 
approached through a survey of the literature to answer the research questions, and a quantitative 
content analysis to test the hypotheses. This content analysis is designed to examine the 
linguistic, rhetorical messages in select articles in the magazine in an aim to decipher the ways in 
which ISIS frames itself, its enemies, and its actions. Through the same content analysis, the 
ways in which ISIS uses Dabiq to disengage the morale of its fighters, supporters, and recruits is 
also examined.  
5.1:  Quantitative research- Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is a form of quantitative research that is used to examine media content 
in a systematic and objective manner. It is one of the most popular data-gathering methods 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). According to Kerlinger, a content analysis is characterized 
by three concepts: systematic, objective and quantitative (Kerlinger, 2000). He explains that it is 
systematic in the sense that there is uniformity in the coding and analysis, and that there is only 
one set of guidelines or categories that is used to examine to whole sample. A content analysis is 
objective in the sense that it should be completely free of the biases and idiosyncrasies of the 
researcher, and should another researcher analyze the same content using the same categories, 
the finding should not differ. The third characterization of a content analysis, according to 
Kerlinger, is that a content analysis is a quantitative method where the data is quantified 
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numerically to give researchers statistical tools to assist in the analysis and interpretation of the 
results (Kerlinger, 2000; Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). Content analyses are used to outline 
dominant themes and messages in the content of the media being analyzed. 
 
Content analyses are used as the basis and starting point of research, and can identify 
directions for further research (Slater, 2013), however, it cannot serve as a basis for effects 
research and examine or make claims about the effects of media on audiences (Wimmer and 
Dominick, 2014). This form of research can only describe media content. A content analysis can, 
for instance, define the dominant news frames used in a specific sample, but cannot analyze the 
effects of those frames on audiences (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). 
This research is conducted through a survey of the literature to answer the research questions, 
and a quantitative content analysis conducted to test the hypotheses. 
5.2: Research Questions-  
 
 
RQ1-  
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use Dabiq to frame itself, its actions, and its 
enemies? 
RQ2- 
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the seven mechanisms of moral disengagement 
in their rhetoric for the moral disengagement of its fighters and supporters? 
RQ3-  
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the framing and moral disengagement 
mechanisms to attempt to create a unified identity? 
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5.3: Hypotheses- 
 
Hypothesis 1- 
Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized 
labels to these actions. 
 
Hypothesis 2- 
There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral 
disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq 
conducted by ISIS.  
 
Hypothesis 3- 
There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS’ usage of the mechanism of moral 
justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of 
responsibility. 
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5.4: Defining the universe- 
The first crucial stage of a content analysis is the definition if the universe. For the purposes of 
this research, the elements of analysis are the issues of Dabiq released by ISIS. Since July 2014, 
ISIS released fifteen issues of Dabiq magazine. The publications of the magazine became less 
frequent with time, but relatively larger in size. The magazine was initially published monthly, 
but then the publications grew further apart, and were issued bimonthly.  
 
5.5: Sampling 
Dabiq only published 15 issues since its inception. These 15 issues contain a total of 206 articles. 
Due to the small size of the population and for a more accurate set of results, and to better enable 
the researcher to answer the research questions as truthfully and accurately as possible, the whole 
population of Dabiq is analyzed in this study.  
 
5.6 The Population- Elements of analysis- 
Based on the parameters of the research, the whole population of Dabiq issues are analyzed.  
 
Issue Number and Name Date of Publishing 
Issue One- "The Return of Khilafah" July 5, 2014 
Issue Two- "The Flood” July 27, 2014 
Issue Three- "A call to Hijrah” September 10, 2014 
Issue Four- "The failed crusade" October 11, 2014 
Issue Five- "Remaining and expanding" November 21, 2014 
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Issue Six- "Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A 
testimony from within" 
December 29, 2014 
Issue Seven- "From hypocrisy to Apostasy: 
The extinction of the gray zone" 
February 12, 2015 
Issue Eight- "Shari'ah Alone will rule Africa" March 30, 2015 
Issue Nine- “They Plot and Allah Plots” May 21, 2015 
Issue Ten- "The Law of Allah or the Laws of 
Men" 
July 13, 2015 
Issue Eleven- “From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb 
to the War of Coalitions" 
August 9, 2015 
Issue Twelve- "Just Terror" November 18, 2015 
Issue Thirteen- "The Rafidah from Ibn Saba' 
to the Dajjal" 
January 19, 2016 
Issue Fourteen- "The Murtadd Brotherhood" April 13, 2016 
Issue Fifteen- "Break the Cross" July 31, 2016 
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5.7: Unit of Analysis- 
The unit of analysis for this study is the whole article. This includes the rhetorical text and the 
headlines. The whole article is chosen as a unit of analysis because the rhetoric in the full article 
provides a contextual assessment.  
 
 
5.8: Coding Sheet Design- 
 
The raison d’etre of the content analysis is to objectively answer the research questions based on 
the theories of framing and selective moral disengagement. The content analysis consists of a 
number of questions aiming at describing the material and discovering recurrent themes and 
frames in the messages. The content analysis explores the frames used in Dabiq to portray ISIS, 
its supporters, its opponents, its territory, and its women and children. The content analysis also 
explores the rhetoric of the magazine in order to identify elements of moral disengagement.  
 
5.9: Operational Definitions- 
  
Term Operational Definition 
TECHNICAL DATA 
1) Issue Number The number of the Dabiq issue from which the article being analyzed 
is chosen. 
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2) Page Number  The number of the page in the Dabiq issue from which the article 
being analyzed is on. 
3) Slug A short name/ keyword given to the article being analyzed, instead of 
using the full headline of the article 
4) Size of Article The size of the article being analyzed depending on its word count 
(ex- less than one page, more than 3 pages… etc) 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
5) Format of Article The genre of the article being analyzed (ex- news report, feature, 
foreword… etc) 
1= News article- an article that discusses recent or current events. 
2= Feature- unlike news articles, a feature focuses on a specific issue/ 
event/ individual with the purpose of giving more information, detail 
and dimension regarding that specific issue. 
3= Foreword/ introduction- The first/ introductory article of every 
issue. 
4= In the enemy’s words- An article appearing in each issue 
dedicated to reporting on the latest issues regarding speeches and 
events held by the “opponents” discussing ISIS. According to Smith, 
Burke, Leiuen, and Jackson, this section occurs in the magazine for 
the purpose of using statements made by Westerners to emphasize the 
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Westerners’ weakness and highlight ISIS’ strength (Smith et. al., 
2015). 
6) Theme of Article The general message behind the article (ex- ISIS boasting successes, 
reporting on capturing and occupation, advices and teachings…etc) 
1= Boasting of accomplishments/ successes- The article is used to 
highlight and announce the recent and current successful endeavors 
made by ISIS, it being conquering new lands, performing new 
attacks… etc. 
2= Reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents- The 
article is used to announce recent events/ speeches made by the 
enemy, where ISIS gets to comment on them, reply to them, and 
announce further actions that could be taken against them. 
3= Reporting on services provided for citizens- The article is used to 
highlight the services ISIS provides for its citizens, for example 
education, health care, social care… etc 
4= Advices, teachings- The article is used to provide wisdom, 
teachings and advice to ISIS’ community (soldiers, citizens, readers, 
followers…). These teachings habitually range from religious 
teachings to teachings about societal issues. 
5= Reporting on training and training camps provided for ISIS’ 
soldiers- The article is used to highlight the trainings and training 
camps ISIS provides for its soldiers, where they receive many forms 
69 
 
of exercising and practice, and also learn how to use artillery and 
advance weaponry, in order to prepare them for battle.  
 
FRAMING 
7) Framing ISIS as Frames are selected aspects of perceived realities that are made more 
salient for the promotion of specific problem definitions, moral 
evaluations, causal interpretations, and/or recommended treatments 
for that issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). A frame is a “central 
organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to events related 
to an issue” (Pan, et al., 1993). Frames such as calling for Muslim 
unity, blaming opponents for responsibility, trying to invoke fear… 
etc.  
1= Gateway to heaven- ISIS claims joining its entity and carrying out 
its deeds assures entry to heaven/ leads to heaven (Warner et. al., 
2015). 
2= Caliphate, large political entity- ISIS refers to itself as a caliphate, 
a strong political organization, with its own governing system. 
3= Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity- ISIS frames 
itself as a dangerous terrorist group and criminalizes its own actions. 
0= Other- please specify 
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8) Framing  ISIS 
supporters as 
1= obedient to God/ Islam, brothers, role models for following ISIS, 
sons of Islam 
ISIS claims that for Muslims to be good, they have to devote 
themselves to jihad against the enemy (Xander, 2015). According to 
Zech and Zane, ISIS describes its members and supporters as “sons 
of Islam” and as brothers (Zech and Zane, 2015). 
2= victims of ISIS 
ISIS often uses violence against its own supporters as a means to 
internally sanction and/or to socialize them, and have them behave in 
a certain manner (Zech and Zane, 2015). 
3= Terrorists, evil, criminals  
ISIS criminalizes its supporters and frames them as evil, terrorists, 
murderers  
4= endangered by the ruling political regime/ other political entities 
(opponent countries/ opponent organizations) 
ISIS frames its supporters as endangered by governments and 
political organizations, and are accordingly taking measures to secure 
their supporters. 
9) Framing ISIS 
opponents as  
1= Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling 
and name-calling- Labelling opponents as disbelievers/ criminals/ 
savages...etc.  
ISIS frames its opponents, which include non-Muslims and Muslims 
who are not supporters of ISIS, Westerners, as well as Muslims who 
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live with non-Muslims, as kufar (disbelievers) and Mushrikin 
(polytheists) who will not be accepted by God, and none of their 
deeds will be accepted by God, unless they join Islam and migrate to 
ISIS (Kibble, 2016 and Xander, 2015). ISIS also frames opponents 
and Westerns as criminals. According to Xander, ISIS constructs 
Western barbarism and Westerners as Crusaders who act as 
exemplars of moral decadence and cruelty, who conspire to invade 
the lands of the Muslims, invade their houses, and invade their 
intellect (Xander, 2015). Other labels may be used throughout the 
rhetoric, such as terrorists, mules (Bayoumy, 2014), apostate rulers, 
armies of the cross (Xander, 2015), zindiq (heretic) (kibble, 2016), 
culpable, deserving criminals (Zech, 2015), spiteful, filthy (Davidson, 
2014), selfish, aggressive and shallow (Xander, 2015) among other 
labels. Labels as such are used by ISIS’ militants to formulate 
narratives to be used for the justification of gruesome actions against 
“the oppressors”, or their enemies (Zech, 2015). 
 
 
2= Innocent members of different communities who, in accordance 
with Islamic teachings, should be defended and protected (Lewis, 
2016). They have the right and the freedom to practice their religion, 
whilst being under the protection of the ruling state (Lewis, 2016). 
Non-followers of the agenda of ISIS, but innocent practitioners of 
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Islam or different religions, who may or may not reside with 
Muslims, but as mere parts of the concept of human civilization 
(Smith et. al., 2015).  
 
 
10) Framing ISIS 
soldiers as 
1= Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ 
protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God) 
ISIS perceives violence used by their soldiers against their enemies to 
be virtuous (Xander, 2015). Xander reports some of ISIS quotes in 
which they say that “the “good” Muslim [is the one] who commits 
him/herself to violent Jihad in defense of the Umma,” (Xander, 
2015). 
ISIS frames their jihadists with themes of bravery, heroism, 
accomplishment, as well as humility, honesty, and friendship 
(Xander, 2015). In his study, Dabiq, the Islamic State's Magazine: A 
Critical Analysis, Kibble says that ISIS propagates the notion that 
Muslims are required to fight for the establishment and expansion of 
the islamic State (Kibble, 2016). Kibble reports ISIS’ saying that 
“Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword and the 
evidence of this is so profuse than only a zindiq [heretic] would argue 
otherwise.” (Kibble, 2016). 
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2= Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers 
Soldiers fighting for ISIS are criminalized and portrayed as 
murderers, evil, cruel, vicious, and a danger to both the out-groups, 
and the in-groups. 
 
 
11) Framing ISIS 
victims as 
1= Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards 
ISIS uses very graphic and vicious methods of killing (Kibble, 2016) 
and most articles in Dabiq are accompanied by graphic images of the 
murders. ISIS announces that all non-supporters (being Muslims 
against ISIS, non-Muslims, Westerners...etc) should be punished and 
killed (Xander, 2015 and Kibble, 2016) 
2= Innocent humans who should be saved 
Victims are portrayed as innocent creatures who should be defended 
and saved, in accordance with Islam’s prophet Muhammad’s 
teachings (Lewis, 2016). Victims are humanized and ISIS’ aim is to 
evoke feelings of sympathy and remorse. 
 
12) Framing ISIS acts 
of violence as 
1= Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic or religious purpose. 
Purposes such as political objectives, punishing wrong-doers, and for 
the sake of ethnic cleansing.  
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Xander quotes an article from the ISIS official publication, Dabiq that 
says that only the good Muslims are the ones who devote themselves 
to defending the Umma through violent Jihad (Xander, 2015). In their 
study,Off With Their Heads: The Islamic State and Civilian 
Beheadings,  Zech and Zane state that the defining element of ISIS’ 
brand is beheading their opponents. (Zech and Zane, 2015). ISIS uses 
portrayals of its gruesome and torturous actions to generate fear, 
intimidate and terrorize particular local and international audiences 
and gain compliance from their enemies (Zech and Zane, 2015). 
In many cases, Kibble reports, ISIS publishes films of its notorious 
acts online, which gain magnificent media attention, to exhibit the 
ways in which they punish their enemies (Kibble, 2016). Of these 
cases, there’s the beheading of the Egyptian Coptic Christians in 
Libya who refused to convert to Islam, the shooting of the 25 Syrian 
soldiers at Palmyra, the three spies who were locked in a car and 
blown up by a rocket-propelled grenade, and the group that was 
placed in a cage and lowered in the water to kill by drowning 
(Kibble, 2016). In Dabiq, graphic photographic images are used to 
exhibit the murders. There are many cases of extreme graphic 
imagery such as the Shia soldiers killed, the severed head of the 
journalist Stephen Sotloff resting on the rest of his body, and a 
woman being stoned to death for committing a sexual misconduct 
(Kibble, 2016). 
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2= Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal 
act.  
ISIS frames its acts as violent and extremely aggressive, but 
necessary acts committed without reason or justification. 
3= Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal 
act.  
ISIS frames its acts as unnecessary acts committed without reason or 
justification.  
13) Presence of 
women in article 
The article includes, discusses, or is centered around female subjects. 
14) If yes, Framing 
women as 
According to Huey, women and young girls started immigrating from 
the West to join ISIS and “begin radically different lives,” (Huey, 
2016). 
 
Huey describes the many different roles women play in the jihadist 
group. Besides the obvious roles of participating in direct terrorist 
activities such as suicide attacks and killings, women in jihadist 
groups actively play a role in the propaganda of recruitment, play the 
role of supporters and family members of the group, train other 
women, run and participate in Islamist summer camps, run women’s 
organizations, distribute Qur’ans in schools and prisons, run internet 
publications, create Islamist organizations and charities, and 
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participate in Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) (Huey, 2016). 
Women have also been reported to immigrate from the West and 
North Africa to become “jihadi brides,” (Christien, 2016). 
 
In some cases, Kibble reports, women have written articles in the 
magazine Dabiq, discussing the taking of slaves during war, which 
they say is a great prophetic sunnah, and discussing how men are 
allowed to marry up to four women (Kibble, 2016).  Kibble reports 
that it’s a common occurrence for members of ISIS to take female 
slaves after killing their husbands (Kibble, 2016).  
 
1= portrayed as fighters 
Women are portrayed as having and practicing military skills, are 
armed, and/or are taking part in violent attacks and missions. 
 
2= portrayed as victims 
Women are portrayed in an injurious state, are suffering from severe 
injure, or are deceased. 
 
3= portrayed as brides/ wives 
Women are portrayed as married brides, and/or performing their 
duties as wives, such as submitting to the leadership of their 
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husbands, respecting and helping their husbands, and/or taking on the 
wives’ household duties, such as cooking, cleaning, and managing a 
household.  
 
4= portrayed as criminals 
Women are portrayed as performing illegal acts that are frowned 
upon and could be punishable by governmental law. 
 
5=portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves 
Women are portrayed as property of another and held captive and 
completely subservient under the dominance of another. Women 
portrayed as sexual slaves are held against their will and forced to 
perform sexual acts. 
 
6= portrayed as mothers 
Women are portrayed as caregivers for their children, providing them 
with basic physiological needs, nurture, affection and protection. 
 
7= Portrayed as leaders 
Women are portrayed principal players in society, as commanders or 
directing heads of an army, group, or organization. 
 
8= Portrayed as teachers 
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Women are portrayed as teachers and instructors passing down their 
knowledge and experience to less-experienced individuals. 
 
15) Presence of 
children/ youth in 
article 
The article includes, discusses, or is centered around children/ youth 
subjects. 
According to Christien, children indicates anyone from 0 to 12 years 
of age, and youth refers to anyone from 12-24 years of age (Christien, 
2016) 
16) If yes, Framing 
Children/ youth as 
According to Christien, children and youth have been featured and 
portrayed in the magazine on very numerous occasions.  
 
1= portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heroes/ seeds of ISIS/ the next 
generation of ISIS  jihadis 
Children and youth have been taking part in many violent attacks, 
and have been acting as fighters and child soldiers for ISIS (Kibble, 
2016 and Christien, 2016). Children have been portrayed in violent 
graphic imagery (Christien, 2016) in Dabiq taking part in executions, 
holding weaponry and standing in front of dead bodies (Kibble, 
2016). In these cases, youth and child soldiers were glorified by ISIS 
for carrying out the prophet’s teachings and wishes against the 
Kuffar, or the non-believers, and the mushrikeen, the polytheists 
(Kibble, 2016). 
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2= portrayed as victims  
Children and youth are portrayed in an injurious state, are suffering 
from severe injure, or are deceased. 
Children and youth have been portrayed as victimization tools to 
represent being victims of Western intervention against Islamist and 
the Islamic state, in an effort to awaken frustration and sentiment 
among the magazine’s target and Western audience (Christien, 2016). 
In some cases, Dabiq published pictures of deceased children’s heads 
and bodies of children killed in bombings (Christien, 2016). 
 
3= portrayed as criminals 
Children and youth are portrayed as performing illegal acts that are 
frowned upon and could be punishable by governmental law. 
 
4= portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child labor, 
slavery, kidnapping) 
Children and youth are portrayed as creatures in physical and 
physiological danger, where they are being held captive, are 
kidnapped, are threatened, or are imprisoned.  
According to Christien, there are many references to children’s 
slavery in Dabiq, and especially young girls enslaved to become 
wives and bear the soldiers’ children, and young boys sold at markets 
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(Christien, 2016). These references are mainly made to threaten the 
enemy’s youth and children (Christien, 2016).  
 
5= taking part in social and institutional roles (learning, reading, in 
social care, in health care) 
 
In order to highlight their role as an institution and a cohesive state, 
ISIS uses the representation of youth and children while taking part in 
institutional roles such as education, healthcare, and justice court 
(Christien, 2016). In Dabiq, youth and children can be seen reading 
the Qur’an while smiling, learning, and being taken care of in 
hospitals, and being looked after in orphanages (Christien, 2016).  
 
 
17) Presence of 
inhumane graphic acts 
Inhumane acts refer to cruel and violent acts committed with no 
remorse or compassion. Graphic acts refer to brutal, vivid and 
realistic violent acts portrayed in visual media.  
In Dabiq, an abundance of examples can be seen of inhumane 
soldiers committing gruesome acts while smiling and while enjoying 
the brutality of their actions. Many graphic scenes are shown of 
soldiers killing, converts to Islam training for war, and even eager 
children learning the ways of ISIS, and learning to fight as well 
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(Kibble, 2016). Dabiq hosts a very large variety of such acts, to name 
a few, executions of prisoners, throat cutting, and burning alive 
(Kibble, 2016). 
  
ELEMENTS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
18) Moral justification 
for inhumane acts 
The first mechanism for moral disengagement is moral justification 
for inhumane acts. In order to justify their harmful conduct, people 
throughout the ages have been exercising moral justification by using 
socially worthy and moral purposes and using themselves as moral 
agents to achieve these moral purposes (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 
1996). Thus, people can reach a level where they view themselves as 
moral agents and sanctify their acts accordingly (Bandura, 2002; 
Bandura, 1996). 
 
1= aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles 
 
According to Kibble, some cases of violence present in Dabiq are 
accompanied by justification of the act and justification of the mode 
of killing, such as in the article that depicts a homosexual man being 
thrown off the roof of a tall building, and the act is justified as an act 
that was previously performed by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the prophet’s 
companion (Kibble, 2016) 
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Article justifies violent acts as acts of sacred acts, performed for 
religious purposes and as religious duties, for god, the prophet, in 
accordance with the Qur’an’s teachings, for following the practices of 
the early Muslim communities (Kibble, 2016), or for any other 
religious or sacred reason by ISIS soldiers, who are regarded as moral 
agents carrying out God’s will and obeying God’s commands, 
saviors, and protectors of Islam and the Ummah (Kibble, 2016).  
 
2= reprimanding political states/ governments 
Article justifies violent acts as acts performed to reprimand enemy 
states, and acts that are performed due to the, or indirectly by, the 
cruelty of enemy states. In this case, ISIS blames the enemy for the 
occurrence of this act.  
In addition, ISIS blames the enemy, and believes that aggressiveness 
is crucial and is vital for combating and defeating the oppressor/ the 
enemy. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a prominent jihadist and one of the 
founders of Al-Qaeda, announced that his main purpose for jihad was 
to protect the Muslim countries against the invasion of foreign forces 
(Kibble, 2016). Similarly, in ISIS’ Dabiq, ISIS urges Muslims to kill 
non-muslim countries to protect their Islamic state (Kibble, 2016). 
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19) Euphemistic 
Labels given to ISIS 
soldiers 
Using respectable terms to label harmful conduct reduces the feelings 
of personal responsibility and empathy. According to Bandura, 
people tend to behave more aggressively when their acts are given 
sanitized labels instead of aggressive ones (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 
1996). For example, when soldiers “waste” people instead of “kill” 
them, and when fighters “hit targets” causing “collateral damage” 
instead of “kill people” causing “a massacre of mass murders,” 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  
 
1= Takes Place - Sanitized labels given to ISIS Soldiers (mujahideen, 
martyrs) 
Soldiers are given sanitized labels to make their job appear holy and 
“good”. Instead of being labeled killers or murderers, they are being 
labeled as “mujahideen”, fighters for God, “martyrs”, a person killed 
defending his religious beliefs and/or people. 
 
2= Doesn’t take place 
 
20) Euphemistic 
Labels given to ISIS 
victims/ opponents 
1= Takes place 
 Sanitized labels given to ISIS opponents and victims (crusaders, 
mushrikin, kufar) 
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ISIS opponents are given sanitized labels to make them appear like 
the cruel and bad agents. Instead of being labeled as Americans or 
Westerners, or ordinary citizens, they are being labeled as “Kuffar”, 
non-believers, “crusaders”, militant Christians, or “Mushrikeen”, 
Polytheists. 
2= Doesn’t take place 
21) Euphemistic 
Labels given to ISIS 
acts of violence  
1= Takes place 
 Sanitized labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence (waste, clean, finish 
off) 
ISIS’ acts of violence are given sanitized labels to make them appear 
less invasive and aggressive. Instead of being labeled as massacres, 
mass murders, or executions, they are being labeled as “finishing 
off”, “wasting”, and “cleaning”. 
 
 
2= Doesn’t take place 
22) Using the 
agentless passive 
voice 
Making inhumane acts appear as the works of nameless forces, and 
not humans, where one turns objects into agents to minimize the 
feeling of empathy and moral agency by evoking the feeling that 
people were mechanically moved and did not kill by hand.  
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For instance saying “the tank bombed the town”, or labelling ISIS’ 
supporters and allies as “team players”, and labelling conspiracies as 
“game plans,” (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). 
 
1= Takes Place 
 
2= Doesn’t take place 
23) Using 
advantageous 
comparisons 
Using advantageous comparisons to compare one’s own actions to 
actions that are regarded as much worse, to make it seem like one’s 
actions aren’t nearly as bad. For instance, ISIS comparing its violent 
acts to those of the enemies or the American government, would 
make it seem like ISIS’ actions aren’t as bad as the enemy’s 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). 
 
ISIS’ acts are compared with more reprehensible acts, to make ISIS’ 
seem righteous.  
ex- Terrorists’ behavior is viewed as self-martyrdom when compared 
to the cruelty of their enemies.  
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
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24) Displacement of 
responsibility 
Bandura argues that people behave in a more aggressive and 
atrocious way when they are given orders from a legitimate authority, 
and thus the responsibility of the acts lie on the higher authority and 
not on themselves (Bandura, 2002). 
According to Kibble, in the instance of the burning of the Jordanian 
pilot, ISIS claims it was merely following the example of their 
prophet Muhammad and his companions at the time (Kibble, 2016). 
 
“The greater the legitimization of the authority, the higher the level of 
obedience aggression will be,” (Bandura, 2002). 
 
1= Carrying out Allah’s orders/ religious duty 
Acts are carried out solely for the purpose of following God’s orders, 
and following the orders of Muhammad, and of Islam.  
 
2= Carrying out ISIS’/ higher authority's orders 
Acts are carried out on the basis of following orders from higher 
hierarchy in the ISIS organization. 
 
3= Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it 
onto themselves) 
The responsibility of the acts being committed lies on the opponents 
and victims. The opponents did not obey the rules, the opponents 
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were trying to sabotage the state, the opponents are against the state, 
and therefore they brought this act on themselves. 
 
25) Diffusion of 
responsibility 
“Where everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible,” 
(Bandura, 2002). 
 
Diffusion of responsibility takes place when atrocious actions are 
performed collectively and in groups, and thus people’s attention 
shifts from what they’re specifically doing (the violent act), to what 
their job description asks of them, and what everyone around them is 
doing without question (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). According 
to Bandura, diffusing responsibility for aggressive behavior obscures 
a person’s moral agency, which results in individuals tending to 
become even more aggressive, as they cease from holding themselves 
accountable, and as they perceive themselves as harmless in a group 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). 
 
In this article, soldiers perform violent actions together in a collective 
act of violence and/or act in armies. 
 
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
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26) Disregard or 
distortion of 
consequences 
Obscuring and weakening moral control can also take place by 
minimizing, disregarding, or distorting the effects and harms caused 
by one's actions. Due to the advancement of warfare artillery, in this 
era of mass destruction, it has become very easy for soldiers to 
commit atrocious murders without having to look at the face of the 
victim at all, for example by using laser-controlled systems, grenades 
and laser-bombs, as well as faceless electronic machinery that only 
require the click of a button, as these methods help depersonalize and 
disregard the inhumanity of one’s actions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 
1996).  
“When the suffering is invisible, it becomes much easier to inflict 
harm,” however when people see the harm they’re causing, they 
become distressed, self-restrained, self-censured (Bandura, 2002; 
Bandura, 1996).  
 
Distorting consequences through the usage of advance war machinery 
that facilitates faceless acts, and aids soldiers in committing crime 
without having to regard the victim’s sufferings.  
 
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
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27) Dehumanization 
of victims 
Seeing their victims as humans, like themselves, makes it much 
harder and very distressful to inflict pain upon them, however 
stripping their victims from their human qualities and dehumanizing 
the victims, makes it much easier to inflict pain upon them without 
the distress of the moral agency (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  
Victims can be labeled as mindless savages, sub-human objects, or 
unfortunate creatures, additionally, beastial and demonic qualities 
could be given to the victims, for instance visualizing the victims as 
low animal forms and satanic creatures (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 
1996). This mechanism helps perpetrators inflict pain more 
aggressively upon their victims without considering their pain, 
families, lives, loved ones, fears, hopes, and concerns (Bandura, 
2002). 
ISIS uses name calling in their writing, such as tyrants, infidels, 
polytheists, and evil-doers, to describe their victims and opponents 
(Wright and Bachmann, 2015). 
 
In this article, victims and opponents of ISIS are being dehumanized 
and labelled in a derogatory way to lessen their value in front of the 
perpetrator.  
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1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
 
 
5.10: Intercoder reliability- 
Intercoder reliability is very important to ensure consistency, shared understanding of 
conceptions, and the lack of bias in a study (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014).  As a means of 
strengthening the reliability of the results, two coders, the researcher and a drama therapy 
master’s degree holder, independently coded 15 percent of the total population. For the purpose 
of cohesion in variable definitions and identifications, training sessions were conducted with the 
second coder to ensure accurate results and accurate inter-coder reliability. 
The statistical analysis used in this study followed the SPSS statistical program. The 
following statistical parameters were calculated as shown below, Wimmer and Dominick (2003). 
 
5.11: Inter-coder Reliability test 
For Nominal data, reliability can be tested in terms of percentage of agreement as follows, Holsti 
(1969): 
                          2M 
Reliability =   ------------ 
                       N1 + N2 
91 
 
Where M is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agree, and N1 and N2 are the 
total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively.     
In our case, a good sample of 30 out of 206 coded sheets were re-coded by a second coder. 
(M=10 and N1=N2=1440) 
    2*710 
                 Reliability   ------------       = 0.986111    =    98.6111 % 
 720 + 720 
An almost perfect match indicating very reliable coding. 
 
5.12: The Chi-Square (χ2) Test: 
χ2 is used to test the homogeneity of distribution of any two variables.  We assume the null 
hypothesis that the 2 distributions are similar. χ2 will measure if the null hypothesis is true  or false. 
χ2 is calculated as the summation of the squares of the differences between expected and 
observed values as a ratio of the expected value, Wimmer and Dominick (2003). 
     (Observed – expected)2 
  χ2 = Σ ------------------------------- 
              expected 
The significance of the resulted value of χ2 is measured by its probability parameter p at 0.05 or 
0.01 levels of probability. If the p value is <0.05 or <0.01, the calculated value of χ2 is significant 
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or highly significant and the distributions of A & B are different (not the same). If p is >0.05, the 
calculated value of χ2 is not significant and the distributions of A & B are similar. 
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Chapter 6 
Results 
 
In this chapter, the results of the content analysis conducted on the population are presented. 
There were two main objectives for the content analysis. The first objective was to determine the 
ways in which ISIS uses crayon frames in its writing. The frames analyzed were the frames 
regarding how ISIS portrayed itself in its media, how it portrayed its soldiers, its victims, its acts 
of violence, as well as its women and children, if available in the article. The second objective of 
the content analysis was to pinpoint the mechanisms of moral disengagement which are present 
in the writing of ISIS. There are 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement, and the goal was to see 
if these mechanisms are being used, and if they are in fact present in the writing.   
 
6.1: Statistics of General Information-  
The whole population of Dabiq was analyzed, as the population itself is not a large one. Dabiq 
published 15 issues since its inception. The 15 issues contained a total of 206 articles, containing 
941 pages worth of material.  
The articles were classified into small (one page or less), medium (more than one page, up till 3 
pages), or large (more than 3 pages) articles. The majority of articles present in Dabiq ranged 
from medium to large articles.  
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Table 1: Size of article 
Size Frequency % 
Small 17 8.3% 
Medium 96 46.6% 
Large 93 45.1% 
Total 206 100% 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Size of article: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
The format/ genre of the articles present in Dabiq ranged from news reports (articles that 
discusses recent or current events), feature stories (articles that focus on a specific issue/ event/ 
individual with the purpose of giving more information, detail and dimension regarding that 
Small
8%
Medi
um
47%
Large
45%
95 
 
specific issue), foreword/ introduction (the first/ introductory article of every issue), or articles 
titles “in the enemy’s words” (articles appearing in each issue dedicated to reporting on the 
latest issues regarding speeches and events held by the “opponents” discussing ISIS).  
The most frequent article genre was the feature articles, followed by the news reports.  
Table 2: Format of article 
Format of article Frequency % 
News report 71 34.5% 
Feature 108 52.4% 
Foreword 11 5.3% 
In the enemy's words 16 7.8% 
Total 206 100% 
 
Chart 2: Format of article: 
  
 
 
The themes of the articles were analyzed to determine which type of messages is mostly 
circulated and conveyed through the magazine. The themes were 1. boasting of 
News 
report
35%
Feature
52%
Foreword
5%
In the 
enemy's 
words
8%
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accomplishments/ successes,  reporting on capturing/ occupation,  prominent executions/ Foley 
and Moath and others, 2. reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents, warning the 
enemy, 3. reporting on services provided for citizens, 4. advices, teachings, 5. reporting on 
trainings and training camps provided for ISIS’ soldiers.  
 
The most prominent theme for the articles was the theme of ISIS boasting of its successes and 
accomplishments, whether its in capturing a prominent figure, performing a mass-mediated 
murder, or conquering new towns and expanding its reign of control.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Theme of article: 
 
 
Theme of article Frequency % 
boasting of accomplishments/ successes,  reporting 
on capturing/ occupation,  prominent executions/ 
foley and moath and others 
92 44.9% 
reporting on and replying to the words of their 
opponents, warning the enemy 
37 18.0% 
reporting on services provided for citizens 6 2.9% 
advices, teachings 69 33.7% 
reporting on trainings and training camps provided 
for ISIS’ soldiers 
1 0.5% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
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Chart 3: Theme of article: 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2: Framing statistics- 
 
Frames are selected aspects of a perceived reality that are made more salient for the promotion of 
a specific message, interpretation, problem definition, causal interpretation or treatment.  
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Framing of ISIS 
The first set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame itself as an 
organization. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing 
itself as a caliphate/ large political organization. ISIS framed itself as such in 106 of the 206 
articles of Dabiq, this frame represented 52.5% of the frames being used to describe the 
organization. The second largely dominant frame is ISIS describing itself as the gateway to 
heaven, or the shortcut to heaven. ISIS constantly used that frame for its audience to highlight 
the phenomenon that one can only go to heaven by joining ISIS. Belonging to a different religion 
is considered disbelieving, being a practicing Muslim living among non-Muslims is considered 
disbelieving, and being a practicing Muslim, living among practicing ones but not migrating to 
ISIS is also considered a form of disbelief in God. ISIS constantly stressed on the idea that the 
only way one is going to heaven in through joining ISIS, and that the only form of worship is 
through jihad (fighting for God) and through implementing the strategy of ISIS. This frame was 
used in 95 out of the 206 articles, representing 47% of the frames being used to describe Dabiq. 
However, framing ISIS as a terrorist organization, such as how the West, the media, and many 
civilian populations frame it, took place in just 1 article out of the whole population of 206 
articles.  
 
Table 4: Framing ISIS as: 
 
 
Framing ISIS as Frequency % 
Gateway to heaven 95 47.0% 
Caliphate/ governing entity, large political entity/ 
terrorizes the enemy 
106 52.5% 
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Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity 
1 0.5% 
Total 202 100% 
Missing 4   
  206   
 
Chart 4: Framing ISIS as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framing of ISIS’ supporters 
 
The second set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame their 
supporters. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing 
47%
53%
1%
Gateway to heaven
Caliphate/ governing entity, large political entity/ terrorizes the enemy
Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity
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its supporters as true role models for Muslims, and as the only figures completely obedient to 
God and to Islam. Supporters of ISIS are framed as brothers and as true good Muslims. ISIS 
mentions its supporters in 182 out of the 206 articles in the population. Out of these 182 
mentions, this frame was used 181 times, representing 99.5% of the amount of times ISIS 
supporters were framed in the whole population of Dabiq. In only one occurrence were ISIS 
supporters framed as victims, 0.5% of the amount of times ISIS supporters were framed in the 
whole population of Dabiq. ISIS supporters were never framed as terrorists or evil-doers, and 
they were never framed as endangered by other ruling political regimes or governments. ISIS 
supporters were constantly framed as victorious and winners of heaven and of God’s 
satisfaction. 
   
Table 5: Framing ISIS supporters as: 
Framing ISIS’ supporters as Frequency % 
Obedient to God/ Islam, true Muslims, brothers, role 
models for following ISIS 
181 99.5% 
Victims 1 0.5% 
Terrorists, evil, criminals 0 0% 
endangered by the ruling political regime/ other 
political entities (opponent countries/ opponent 
organizations) 
0 0% 
Total 182 100% 
Missing 24   
  206   
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Chart 5: Framing ISIS supporters as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framing of ISIS’ opponents 
The third set of frames analyzed in the study are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame its 
opponents. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing its 
opponents as members of the out-group, and as enemies. The rhetoric of the magazine also 
referred to ISIS’ opponents through the use of name calling, such as savage beasts, and labelling, 
using labels kuffar and murtaddin. Opponents of ISIS were mentioned in the whole population of 
206 Dabiq articles 189 times. This frame was used in all of the 189 mentions of the opponents, or 
100%
1%0
Obedient to God/ Islam, true Muslims, brothers, role models for following ISIS
Victims
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100% of the whole mentions of the opponents, making it the only frame used for describing 
ISIS’ opponents. ISIS supporters, however, are never framed in the magazine as terrorists, or 
criminals or evil-doers, and they are also never mentioned as wanted by the government, or 
endangered by the ruling regime. 
   
Table 6: Framing ISIS opponents as: 
 
Framing ISIS’ opponents as Frequency % 
Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of 
labelling and name-calling 
189 100.0% 
Innocent members of different communities who should 
be defended and protected. 
0 0% 
Total 189 100% 
Missing 17   
  206   
 
Chart 6: Framing ISIS opponents as: 
100%
0%
Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling and name-
calling
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Framing of ISIS’ soldiers 
The fourth set of frames analyzed in the magazine are the frames used by ISIS to describe and 
frame their soldiers. ISIS’ soldiers were mentioned in 173 of the 206 articles. The most dominant 
frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing its soldiers as Mujahideen, or 
fighters in the name of God. The rhetoric of the magazine also referred to ISIS’ soldiers through 
the use of labels, such as lions, heroes, saviors, protectors, moral agents or martyrs (soldiers who 
die in battle) in the name of God. This particular frame appeared 172 times, representing 99.4% 
of the whole population of soldiers mentioned in the magazine. In only one occasion, 0.6%, were 
soldiers mentioned as terrorists (ones who inflict terror) and vicious.  
 
Table 7: Framing ISIS soldiers as: 
Framing ISIS soldiers as Frequency % 
Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ 
saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for 
God) 
172 99.4% 
Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers 
1 0.6% 
Total 173 100% 
Missing 33   
  206   
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Chart 7: Framing ISIS soldiers as 
 
 
 
 
Framing of ISIS’ victims 
The fifth set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame the victims on 
which they inflicted pain. Of 206 articles, victims were mentioned, shown, and portrayed 160 
times. The most dominant frame present in those mentions is the frame that emphasized that 
these victims deserve to be hurt, that they must be punished for their actions, for their beliefs, or 
for not supporting ISIS, and that these victims brought this pain onto themselves by not joining 
ISIS. This frame was present 159 times of the 160 times, therefore representing 99.4% of the 
99%
1%
Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God)
Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers
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entire population of victims mentioned in the magazine. In only one occasion, 0.6%, victims 
were portrayed as innocent humans.  
 
 
Table 8: Framing ISIS victims as: 
Framing ISIS victims as Frequency % 
Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards 159 99.4% 
Innocent humans who should be saved 1 0.6% 
Total 160 100% 
Missing 46   
  206   
   
Chart 8: Framing ISIS victims as: 
 
 
 
 
99%
1%
Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards
Innocent humans who should be saved
106 
 
 
 
Framing of ISIS’ acts of violence 
The sixth set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame their actions of 
violence. Of 206 articles, violent actions were mentioned, shown, and portrayed 159 times. The 
most dominant frame present in those mentions is the frame that emphasized that these actions of 
violence were necessary actions taken to either fulfil a strategic purpose, for instance to gain 
more land or to pressure a certain enemy/government, or they were taken to fulfil a religious 
purpose, for instance killing the “Crusaders” (Christians) or the Muslim Shi’ites because they are 
considered by ISIS to be non-believers.. This frame was present 146 times of the 159 times, 
therefore representing 91.8% of the entire population of violent actions mentioned in the 
magazine. The second frame that was used to describe violent actions is that they are necessary 
actions of gruesome torture or extreme violence. This frame is used for specific individual cases, 
for example the capturing of journalists, spies, or foreign soldiers. In these cases, ISIS commits 
extremely violent acts, such as beheading a spy and placing his head on top of his torso, making 
child soldiers (not older than 8 or 9 years old) murder an enemy of ISIS. In these cases, the 
purpose of the violent act is to show gruesome torture that would frighten the enemy, and make 
as an example of the victims. These cases, unlike the previous ones, are not meant to be framed 
to fulfil a political or religious purpose, but are only meant to be framed as necessary actions of 
gruesome torture. This frame is present 13 times in the issues, which makes it represent 8.2% of 
the population of violent acts present in the magazine. The violent acts in the magazine were 
never framed as unnecessary, as criminal acts, or as inhumane acts. 
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Table 9: Framing ISIS acts of violence as: 
Framing ISIS acts of violence as Frequency % 
Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and 
religious purpose. 
146 91.8% 
Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence 
13 8.2% 
Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme 
violence/ criminal act 
0 0% 
Total 159 100% 
Missing 47   
  206   
 
Chart 9: Framing ISIS acts of violence as: 
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Framing of women 
The seventh set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame ISIS’ women. 
Of 206 articles, women were only mentioned, shown, and portrayed in 14 articles, or in only 
6.8% of the entire Dabiq population. In 2 cases, 1%, women were framed as fighters/ soldiers of 
ISIS, armed and participating in battle. In 2 other cases, 1%, women were framed as victims of 
ISIS, ones being murdered or severely injured by the organization. In 3 cases, 1.5%, women 
were framed as criminals, committing crime against ISIS, by supporting causes that oppose ISIS. 
In 2 cases, 1%, women were framed as slaves, this includes being sold and bought in slavery 
markets, being taken as slaves after their non-ISIS supporting husbands are murdered by ISIS, 
and being used as sexual slaves to please ISIS soldiers after battle. In 5 cases, 2.4%, women were 
framed in “habitual” societal roles, such as being mothers and performing their motherly duties 
with their children, being framed as wives, supporting their husbands, and taking care of their 
households. The frames that did not exist at all in the Dabiq population is framing women as 
leaders, as teachers, or as new brides.  
 
Table 10: Framing of women 
Framing of women Frequency % 
Women not present 192 93.2% 
portrayed as fighters 2 1.0% 
portrayed as victims 2 1.0% 
portrayed as brides/ wives 0 0% 
portrayed as criminals 3 1.5% 
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portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves 2 1.0% 
portrayed as mothers/ wives/ supporters of their 
husbands 
5 2.4% 
portrayed as leaders 0 0% 
portrayed as teachers 0 0% 
Total 206 100% 
 
Chart 10: Framing of women 
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Framing of children 
The final set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame ISIS’ children. Of 
206 articles, children were only mentioned, shown, and portrayed in 26 articles, or in only 12.6% 
of the entire Dabiq population. In 11 cases, 5.3%, children were frames as fighters/ soldiers of 
ISIS, armed, participating in battle, and taking part in extremely graphic and violent acts and 
murders. In this frame, children were labeled as lions, heroes, seeds of ISIS, true Muslims, the 
next of generation of jihadists, and role models. In 4 cases, 1.9%, children were framed as 
victims of ISIS, being murdered or severely injured by the organization. In only 1 case, 0.5%, 
children were framed as criminals, committing crime against ISIS, by supporting causes that 
oppose ISIS. In 2 cases, 1%, children were framed as being endangered. This includes 
physiological danger, being forced into child labor, being captured, kidnapped, or sold in slavery 
markets.  
In 8 cases, 3.9%, children were framed as taking part in “habitual” societal and institutional 
roles, such as being in school, learning, reading Qur’an, in social care and orphanages, or being 
taken care of in health care institutions and hospitals.  
 
Table 11: Framing of children/youth 
Framing of children/ youth Frequency % 
Not present 180 87.4% 
portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heroes/ seeds of ISIS/ the 
next generation of ISIS  jihadis 
11 5.3% 
portrayed as victims  4 1.9% 
portrayed as criminals 1 0.5% 
portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child 
labor, slavery, kidnapping) 
2 1.0% 
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portrayed as taking part in social and institutional roles 
(learning, reading, in social care, in health care) 
8 3.9% 
Total 206 100% 
 
 
 
   
Chart 11: Framing of children/youth 
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Presence of inhumane, violent, and graphic acts 
 
Dabiq, just like other methods of terrorist media, is known for its detailed and abundant 
portrayals of graphic content featuring extremely violent and inhumane acts. In 206 articles, 
violent acts are present 125 times, 61.3%, of the total population of the Dabiq articles.  
 
 
 
Table 12: Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts  
Presence of violent acts Frequency % 
Yes 125 61.3% 
No 79 38.7% 
Total 204 100% 
Missing 2   
  206   
 
 
 
 
Chart 12: Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
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6.3: Statistics of presence of Elements of moral disengagement 
 
 
The theory of selective moral disengagement, proposed by Albert Bandura, suggests that 
morality functions only when it is willingly activated. However, certain mechanisms and 
psychological maneuvers could be used to disengage one’s morality, thus allowing them to 
commit immoral and atrocious acts and behave in an inhumane manner (Bandura, 2002 and 
Weimann, 2008).  In order to willingly exercise moral disengagement, the theory suggests 
seven mechanisms: Moral justification, euphemistic labelling, advantageous comparisons, 
displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion of 
consequences, and dehumanization.  
For the purpose of this study, the rhetoric of the magazine Dabiq was analyzed to recognize the 
presence of these seven mechanisms that allow ISIS to disengage the morality of their soldiers, 
their community, their supporters, and their readers. 
 
Moral justification for inhumane acts 
The first mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the element of 
moral justification for inhumane acts. This mechanism is present in 199 of the 206 Dabiq 
articles, making it one of the pillars of the rhetoric in the magazine, representing 97.2% of the 
entire Dabiq population. In 118 articles, 57.6%, aggressiveness and inhumane acts are justified 
in the name of religious principles, where ISIS states that its actions are conducted in the name 
of God, in the name of the prophet, or in honor of Islam. In 81 articles, 39.5%, aggressiveness 
and inhumane acts are said to be performed as a way of reprimanding political states and 
governments for the political stances and their actions against ISIS. Moral justification is not 
present in only 7 articles, 3%, out of the whole population of 206 articles. 
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Table 13: Moral justification for inhumane acts 
 
Moral Justification Frequency % 
aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles 
118 57.6% 
reprimanding political states/ governments 81 39.5% 
Does not take place 6 2.9% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
 
 
 
Chart 13: Moral justification for inhumane acts 
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Euphemistic Labelling 
 
 
The second mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the element 
of euphemistic labelling. In this study, euphemistic labelling was analyzed on a number of 
factors: labelling ISIS soldiers, labelling ISIS victims/ opponents, and labelling ISIS’ acts of 
violence.  
 
Euphemistic labels given to ISIS soldiers 
Sanitized labels are given to the soldiers of ISIS in order to undertone their real job description. 
Therefore instead of being named murderers or terrorists, they are given sanitized labels, such 
as mujahideen (fighters of God), martyrs (fighters who die in the name of God) and lions. Such 
labels assist in elevating their status, and make them unaware of the true repercussions of their 
acts. This mechanism of labelling is applied to soldiers in 178 of the 206 Dabiq articles, 
representing 87.3% of the entire population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does 
not take place in only 26 articles, 12.7%.  
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Table 14: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers- 
 
 
Sanitized Labels given to ISIS’ Soldiers Frequency % 
Takes place 178 87.3% 
Does not take place 26 12.7% 
Total 204 100% 
Missing 2   
  206   
 
 
 
 
Chart 14: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers- 
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Euphemistic labels given to ISIS victims and opponents 
Sanitized labels are given to ISIS’ victims and opponents in order to morally disengage the 
soldiers inflicting harm upon them, and in order to morally disengage the supporters and 
citizens of ISIS from feeing sympathetic towards them.   
Therefore instead of being named victims, they are given sanitized labels, such as kuffar 
(disbelievers) and murtaddin (previously Muslims, but not regarded as ones anymore). Such 
labels assist in devaluating the victims and the opponents, and makes it easier for soldiers to 
inflict harm upon them. This mechanism of labelling is applied to victims and opponents in 174 
of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 84.9% of the entire population of soldier mentions in 
Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in only 31 articles, 15.1%.  
 
 
Table 15: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS’ Victims/opponents 
 
 
Sanitized Labels given to ISIS’ Victims/opponents Frequency % 
Takes place 174 84.9% 
Does not take place 31 15.1% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
Chart 15: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Victims/opponents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Euphemistic labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence  
Sanitized labels are given to ISIS’ acts of violence in order to undertone to atrocity and severity 
of the acts, and undertone to harm caused and inflicted onto the victims. Therefore instead of 
being called mass murders and massacres, ISIS’ violent acts are given sanitized labels, such as 
waste, clean and finish off. Such labels assist in decreasing the perception of the violent acts, so 
they sound more naive and less invasive and violent. This mechanism of labelling is applied to 
ISIS’ acts of violence in 146 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 71.6% of the entire 
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population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in 58 articles, 
28.4%. 
Table 16: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence 
    
Sanitized labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence Frequency % 
Takes place 146 71.6% 
Does not take place 58 28.4% 
Total 204 100% 
Missing 2   
  206   
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 16: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence 
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Using the agentless passive voice 
 
Using the agentless passive voice is a technique that lies under the umbrella of euphemistic 
labelling. This technique is used to make inhumane and violent acts appear as the works of 
nameless forces, not humans, thus turning objects into agents. For instance saying “the tank 
bombed the town” instead of saying the soldiers attacked the town and massacred its people, 
thus turning the tank into an agent, rather than an object. This technique of euphemistic 
labelling is applied to ISIS’ acts of violence in 96 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 46.8% 
of the entire population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in 
109 articles, 53.2%. 
 
 
Table 17: Using the agentless passive voice 
 
 
 
Using the agentless passive voice Frequency % 
Takes place 96 46.8% 
Does not take place 109 53.2% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
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Chart 17: Using the agentless passive voice 
 
 
Using advantageous comparisons 
 
 
The third mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism 
of using advantageous comparisons. The use of advantageous comparisons occurs when 
someone tries to compare their acts with the more reprehensible acts of others, for their own 
advantageous benefit and/or to make their acts seem more righteous. In the case of Dabiq, in 
many cases ISIS’ compares its acts to more reprehensible acts of others, for example comparing 
one of their raids with the Nazi Holocaust, comparing a vicious beheading to the US invasion of 
Iraq, or viewing suicide bombing as self-martyrdom where a soldier sacrifices their life to 
protect the state from the atrocities of a certain political state. This mechanism occurs in 129 of 
the Dabiq articles, 63%, or in about two-thirds of the whole Dabiq population. 
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Table 18: Using advantageous comparisons 
 
 
 
Using advantageous comparisons Frequency % 
Takes place 129 63% 
Does not take place 76 37% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
 
 
 
Chart 18: Using advantageous comparisons 
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Displacement of responsibility 
 
 
The fourth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the 
mechanism of displacement of responsibility. Moral control is highly affective when 
individuals perceive their responsibility of harming someone, however, when individuals cease 
from taking responsibility, and the responsibility is thus placed on a different agent, or this 
responsibility is minimalized or obscured, moral disengagement takes place. Thus, Bandura 
argues, that when a legitimate authority claims responsibility for the act, soldiers become 
morally disengaged and become more comfortable performing the act, no matter how violent it 
is. The greater the legitimization of the authority, the higher the level of obedience aggression 
will be (Bandura, 2002). In the case of ISIS, not only is responsibility placed on higher 
authority, but it is placed on God and Islam. ISIS leaders constantly teach their soldiers that 
God asked them to kill the disbelievers, and that God wants them to commit these acts. This 
scenario takes place in 110 of the Dabiq articles, 53.4% of the total population of articles. In 
other cases, ISIS’ leaders blame the responsibility on their enemies and opponents. They claim 
that by being disbelievers, they brought it onto themselves, and they deserve killing, or that by 
supporting certain policies, they deserve punishing. This scenario has occurred in 84 Dabiq 
articles, 40.8% of the total population of articles. Only in 12 articles out of the whole Dabiq 
population, 5.8%, does this mechanism not take place.  
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
 
Table 19: Displacement of responsibility 
 
 
Displacement of responsibility Frequency % 
Carrying out Allah’s orders/ religious duty/ duties of 
higher authority’s orders, including ISIS 
110 53.4% 
Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they 
brought it onto themselves) 
84 40.8% 
Does not take place 12 5.8% 
Total 206 100% 
 
Chart 19: Displacement of responsibility 
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Diffusion of responsibility 
 
 
The fifth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism 
of diffusion of responsibility. People act more violently under a group then when they are 
taking all the responsibility of the harm themselves (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Diffusion 
of responsibility is the act of dividing the labor, taking collective action, and making group 
decisions, and thus acting in groups weakens moral control and personal agency, allowing 
soldiers to act more violently without feeling responsible, and while obscuring their moral 
agency. In the case of ISIS, not only is responsibility diffused among the collective acts of the 
army, the group fighting, and even the group suicide bombing, but responsibility is also shared 
with God. In Dabiq, ISIS constantly mentions that with God, soldiers have been able to capture 
a certain town, or with the blessings of God and the Prophet, someone was successfully 
murdered. This scenario takes place in 150 of the Dabiq articles, 73.2% of the total population 
of articles. This scenario, however, does not occur in 55 articles, 26.8%, out of the Dabiq 
population.  
 
 Table 20: Diffusion of responsibility 
 
 
Diffusion of responsibility Frequency % 
Takes place 150 73.2% 
Does not take place 55 26.8% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
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Chart 20: Diffusion of responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disregard or distortion of consequences 
 
 
The sixth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism 
of disregard and distortion of consequences. By distorting, minimizing, or obscuring the effects 
caused by one’s violent actions, moral control is weakened. When the suffering is invisible, it 
becomes much easier to inflict harm (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Due to the advancement 
of artillery and weapon technology, mass destruction takes place with the push of a button. 
Also, faceless electronic warfare, such as laser-controlled artillery and faceless electronic 
warfare make it much easier to inflict pain without ever having to look in the victim’s face. 
Soldiers act more violently when they cannot see or hear their victims’ pain and suffering 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).  
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This scenario takes place in Dabiq as the advancement of technology allow soldiers to commit 
the most atrocious of acts without ever having to come in contact with their victims, and thus 
severely weakening their moral agency and disengaging their morality. This scenario takes 
place in 142 of the Dabiq articles, 69.3% of the total population of articles. This scenario, 
however, does not occur in 63 articles, 30.7%, out of the Dabiq population. 
  
Table 21: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences 
   
Disregard or Distortion of Consequences Frequency % 
Takes place 142 69.3% 
Does not take place 63 30.7% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
Chart 21: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences 
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Dehumanization of victims 
 
 
The final mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism 
of dehumanization of victims. When perpetrator see the victims as humans such as themselves, 
elements of similarity activate empathetic reactions. Therefore, it is much easier for perpetrators 
to strip their victims of their human qualities, and instead dehumanize them, so they don't have 
to consider their feelings, their families, and their pain (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). ISIS 
implements this technique by regarding its victims as sub-human objects, and unfortunate 
creatures. In many cases in the magazine, victims are labeled in ways such as mindless savages 
and unfortunate creatures, furthermore, beastial and satanic qualities are attributed to them.  
 By dehumanizing the victims, it becomes much easier to inflict harm upon them (Bandura, 
2002; Bandura, 1996). This scenario takes place in 84 of the Dabiq articles, 41% of the total 
population of articles. This scenario, however, does not occur in 121 articles, 59%, of the Dabiq 
population. 
 
Table 22: Dehumanization of victims 
     
Dehumanization of victims Frequency % 
Takes place 84 41% 
Does not take place 121 59% 
Total 205 100% 
Missing 1   
  206   
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Chart 22: Dehumanization of victims 
 
 
 
 
6.4: Hypothesis 1 
Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized 
labels to these actions. 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between framing ISIS’ 
acts of violence and the euphemistic labels attributed to them. Results indicate different 
distributions of percentages of framing ISIS’ acts of violence for the two necessities 
(Euphemistic labels takes place 89.7% for the necessary actions taken to fulfill a strategic and 
religious purpose; while it takes place 38.5% for the necessary acts of gruesome torture / extreme 
violence). 
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Chi square χ2 = 84.511 (p=0.000) Highly significant  
 
Table 23: Relationship of Framing ISIS acts of violence and Euphemistic Labels given to 
ISIS acts of violence 
Framing ISIS acts of violence as 
Euphemistic 
Labels given to 
ISIS acts of 
violence-  Total 
Takes 
Place 
Doesn’t 
take 
place 
Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and 
religious purpose. 
131 15 146 
89.7% 10.3% 100.0% 
Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence 
5 8 13 
38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 
Total 
136 23 159 
85.5% 14.5% 100.0% 
Chi square χ2 = 84.511 (p=0.000) Highly significant  
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Chart 23: Relationship of Framing ISIS acts of violence and Euphemistic Labels given to 
ISIS acts of violence 
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6.5: HYPOTHESIS 2 
 
There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral 
disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq 
conducted by ISIS. 
 
 
Mechanism 1- Moral justification 
 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between 
moral justification for inhumane acts and the presence or absence of inhumane, violent, graphic 
acts. Results indicate different distributions of percentages for inhumane acts for the presence or 
absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts (Percent presence of inhumane acts is higher for 
aggressiveness - 70.1% - and lower for reprimanding - 53.1% and 0.0% does not take place. The 
distributions are the reverse in case of absence of inhumane acts). 
Chi square χ2 = 14.061 (p=0.001) highly significant 
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Table 24: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Moral justification for inhumane acts- 
Presence of inhumane, violent, 
graphic acts- Total 
Yes No 
aggressiveness is in the name of religious 
principles 
82 35 117 
70.1% 29.9% 100.0% 
reprimanding political states/ governments 
43 38 81 
53.1% 46.9% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
0 5 5 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
Chi square χ2 = 14.061 (p=0.001) highly significant  
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Chart 24: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
 
 
 
Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between the presence 
or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the euphemistic labels attributed to them. Results 
indicate different distributions of percentages of euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of 
violence (In case Yes, taking place is 70.5% and Not taking place is 39.3%. The reverse is true in 
case of No)  
Chi square χ2 = 16.770 (p=0.000) highly significant.  
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Table 25: Relationship of Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence and 
presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of 
violence-  
Presence of inhumane, violent, 
graphic acts- Total 
Yes No 
Takes place 
103 43 146 
70.5% 29.5% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
22 34 56 
39.3% 60.7% 100.0% 
Total 
125 77 202 
61.9% 38.1% 100.0% 
Chi square χ2 = 16.770 (p=0.000) highly significant.  
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Chart 25: Relationship of Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence and presence/ 
absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
 
 
Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling- Using the agentless passive voice 
 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between the presence 
or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of the agentless passive voice when 
mentioning them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of Using the agentless 
passive voice (Yes has high Takes place – 78.1% - and low does not take place - 46.7% -,and No 
has a reverse distribution)  
Chi square χ2 = 21.081 (p=0.000) highly significant. 
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Table 26: Relationship of Using the agentless passive voice and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Using the agentless passive 
voice- 
Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts- 
Total 
Yes No 
Takes place 
75 21 96 
78.1% 21.9% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
50 57 107 
46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
Chi square χ2 = 21.081 (p=0.000) highly significant. 
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Chart 26: Relationship of Using the agentless passive voice and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
 
 
Mechanism 3- Using advantageous comparisons-  
A chi square test was performed showing a significant (p<0.05) relationship between the 
presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of advantageous comparisons when 
mentioning them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of using advantageous 
comparisons (takes place higher- 66.7% - in Yes and lower -33.3% - in No)  
Chi square χ2 = 8.946 (p=0.011) significant  
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Table 27: Relationship of Using advantageous comparisons and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Using advantageous 
comparisons 
Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts- 
Total 
Yes No 
Takes place 
86 43 129 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
39 35 74 
52.7% 47.3% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
Chi square χ2 = 8.946 (p=0.011) significant  
Chart 27: Relationship of Using advantageous comparisons and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
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Mechanism 4- Diffusion of responsibility-  
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between the 
presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of diffusion of 
responsibility when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. Results indicate a 
highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of Diffusion of 
responsibility in case of Yes or No)  
Chi square χ2 = 23.117 (p=0.000) Highly significant 
 
Table 28: Relationship of Diffusion of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, 
violent, graphic acts 
Diffusion of responsibility- Soldiers act alone- act 
together- collective violence in armies- with allah 
Presence of inhumane, 
violent, graphic acts- Total 
Yes No 
Takes place 
107 43 150 
71.3% 28.7% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
18 35 53 
34.0% 66.0% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
 
Chi square χ2 = 23.117 (p=0.000) Highly significant 
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Chart 28: Relationship of Diffusion of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, 
violent, graphic acts 
 
 
 
Mechanism 5- Displacement of responsibility-  
 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between the 
presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of displacement of 
responsibility when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. Results indicate a 
highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of carrying out 
Allah’s orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority’s orders, including ISIS (Yes has high 
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percent of the two items of Takes place – 60.9% & 70.7% - and low does not take place – 46.2% 
, while No has a reverse distribution) The highly significant (p<0.01) chi square indicates 
different) 
Chi square = 22.084  (p=0.000) Highly significant 
 
Table 29: Relationship of Displacement of responsibility and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Displacement of responsibility- 
Presence of inhumane, violent, 
graphic acts- Total 
Yes No 
Carrying out Allah’s orders/ religious 
duty/ duties of higher authority’s 
orders, including ISIS 
67 43 110 
60.9% 39.1% 100.0% 
Acts carried out are the fault of the 
opponents (they brought it onto 
themselves) 
  
58 
24 82 
  
70.7% 
29.3% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
0 12 12 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
125 79 204 
61.3% 38.7% 100.0% 
Chi square = 22.084  (p=0.000) Highly significant 
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Chart 29: Relationship of Displacement of responsibility and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
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Mechanism 6- Disregard or Distortion of Consequences- 
 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between the 
presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of disregard and 
distortion of consequences when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. The 
results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of 
the percentage of the mechanism of disregard or distortion of consequences (Yes has high Takes 
place – 78.2% - and low does not take place – 23.0% -, while No has a reverse distribution) 
Chi square = 54.989 (p=0.000) Highly significant) 
 
Table 30: Relationship of Disregard or Distortion of Consequences and presence/absence of 
inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
Disregard or Distortion of 
Consequences- 
 
Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic 
acts- Total 
  
Yes 
No 
Takes place 
111 31 142 
78.2% 21.8% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
14 47 61 
23.0% 77.0% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
Chi square = 54.989 (p=0.000) Highly significant 
145 
 
  
Chart 30: Relationship of Disregard or Distortion of Consequences and presence/absence 
of inhumane, violent, graphic acts 
 
 
 
Mechanism 7- Dehumanization of victims- 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between the 
presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the usage of the victim dehumanization. The 
results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of 
the mechanism of dehumanization of victims (Yes has high Takes place – 83.3% - and low does 
not take place – 46.2% -, while No has a reverse distribution).  
 
Chi square = 28.669 (p=0.000) Highly significant 
TAKES PLACE DOES NOT TAKE 
PLACE
78%
23%
22%
77%
RELATIONSHIP OF DISREGARD OR DISTORTION 
OF CONSEQUENCES AND PRESENCE/ABSENCE 
OF INHUMANE, VIOLENT, GRAPHIC ACTS
Yes No
146 
 
Table 31: Relationship of Dehumanization of victims and presence/absence of inhumane, 
violent, graphic acts 
Dehumanization of victims 
  
Presence of inhumane, violent, 
graphic acts- Total 
  
Yes 
No 
Takes place 
70 14 84 
83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
55 64 119 
46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
Total 
125 78 203 
61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 
Chi square = 28.669 (p=0.000) Highly significant  
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Chart 31: Relationship of Dehumanization of victims and presence/absence of inhumane, 
violent, graphic acts 
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6.6: HYPOTHESIS 3- 
There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS’ usage of the mechanism of moral 
justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of 
responsibility. 
A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant (p<0.01) relationship between the 
Moral justification for ISIS’ inhumane acts and the Displacement of responsibility on Allah and 
the opposing governments. Results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different 
distributions of percentages of moral justification for inhumane acts (In case of carrying Allah’s 
orders , aggressiveness high -79.7% - and reprimanding political states low - 18.5% - and down 
to zero does not take place. The reverse is true for Acts carried out… and does not take place) = 
Chi square χ2 = 96.280 (p=0.000) Highly significant  
Table 32: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Displacement of 
responsibility  
Moral justification for 
inhumane acts- 
Displacement of responsibility- 
Total Carrying out 
Allah’s 
orders 
Acts carried out are the 
fault of the opponents  
Does not 
take 
place 
aggressiveness is in the name 
of religious principles 
94 23 1 118 
79.7% 19.5% 0.8% 100.0% 
reprimanding political 
states/ governments 
15 58 8 81 
18.5% 71.6% 9.9% 100.0% 
Does not take place 
0 3 3 6 
0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total 
109 84 12 205 
53.20% 41.00% 5.90% 100.00% 
Chi square χ2 = 96.280 (p=0.000) Highly significant  
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Chart 32: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Displacement of 
responsibility  
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Chapter 7 
Discussion 
The final chapter of this thesis provides a brief overview of the findings of the study as well as 
the discussion of the three research questions posed according to the pertinence of the results.  
 
7.1: Summary of study problem and methodology- 
 For the purposes of this study, a content analysis was conducted to analyze the rhetoric of 
the full population of 15 Dabiq issues published. Dab is the official English language magazine 
produced by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The content analysis was conducted to study two 
main aspects of the rhetoric in Dabiq, the use of framing, and the use of the 7 mechanisms of 
selective moral disengagement.  
 
 
7.2: Review and discussion of the main conclusions of the study 
 
Three research questions were posed for this study.  
 
7.2.1: Research Questions-  
 
Framing- Research Question 1-  
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use Dabiq to frame itself, its actions, and its 
enemies? 
The first research question posed for this study was posed to analyze the way in which ISIS uses 
the rhetoric in Dabiq to frame itself as an organization, to frame its actions, and to frame its 
enemies. 
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 Through Dabiq, ISIS attempts to frame itself and its fighters and supporters in a direction 
completely opposite of the one they are framed with in global media. In most global media, ISIS 
is constantly framed as a terrorist group, as a bunch of guerilla fighters, and as a group that does 
not represent Islam. Using their own media, Dabiq, ISIS attempts to change the way it is framed 
in the perception of its target audience, mainly its fighters and supporters.  The results of the 
content analysis show that there are two main directions ISIS uses to frame itself in its media. 
The first direction is ISIS framing itself as a gateway to heaven, as the shortcut to heaven, and 
the one way to God’s acceptance. The second direction is ISIS framing itself as a caliphate, a 
governing entity, and a large political organization, that has a governing body, and a caliph 
(president). This caliphate is meant to be regarded as such, should be feared by the enemy, and 
works on terrorizing the enemy. Through the content analysis, the framing of ISIS to its 
supporters was also analyzed.  Unlike how they are framed in global media, as terrorists and non-
representative of Muslims, through most of the rhetoric of the magazine, 99.5%, ISIS frames its 
supporters as true role models for Muslims, as obedient to God into Islam and as part of the in-
group. ISIS opponents were framed very significantly in the magazine as well. In all of the cases 
in the magazine, 100%, where the opponents were mentioned, they were mentioned as being part 
of the out-group, they were portrayed as enemies, and they were always given derogatory labels 
such as filthy beasts and mindless savages. Opponents in the magazine were also framed as being 
Kuffar (disbelievers), murtaddin, and unworthy of living. ISIS’ soldiers were also remarkably 
framed as heroes, lions, saviors and protectors, as well as mujahideen (fighters for God) and 
martyrs (ones who sacrificed their lives for God). Soldiers were framed as moral agents, unlike 
how they are framed in global media as terrorists and criminals. As for ISIS’ victims, the ones 
portrayed in global media as innocent lives that should be saved from the atrocities of jihadists, 
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ISIS frames them as opponents who deserve to be hurt and punished for the beliefs, for their 
actions, and for not-supporting ISIS. They are framed as kuffar who should be killed for the sake 
and acceptance of God and Islam. ISIS’ acts of violence and attacks, which are framed by global 
media as atrocious and vicious acts of terror and crime, are framed in quite the opposite way in 
the magazine. In Dabiq, these actions are framed as necessary acts taken to fulfil a strategic or 
religious purpose. These purposes range from being performed for political purposes such as 
challenging a certain government/ political leader, conquering new land, or terrorizing a certain 
enemy/ government/ entity, to being performed for religious purposes, such as killing a group 
ISIS deems is a disbeliever (such as Christians, or Shi’ite Muslims), or punishing a Muslim 
wrong-doer (for instance, a women who committed adultery or a homosexual man).  
 In global media, ISIS is framed as a terrorist fighter group, however in the magazine, 
ISIS is framed as a complete caliphate, ruled by a government, and containing all institutional 
roles of a state, such as schools, hospitals and orphanages. Women and children of ISIS rarely 
take part in global media coverage. However in Dabiq, they do take a slight part in the coverage. 
Women are portrayed in 6.8% of the total Dabiq population. Even though they are minimally 
portrayed, they are framed in ways that show that they are taking part in all societal roles. In 
some cases women are framed as fighters and soldiers, in other cases, women are framed as 
mothers and wives supporting their husbands. Besides these frames, in other cases, women are 
framed as criminals, slaves, sexual slaves, and victims. Children, on the other hand, are 
mentioned slightly more than women are in the magazine. They are present in 12.6% of the total 
Dabiq population. However, in their framing the two most dominant frames used are: framing 
children as fighters where they’re describes as being lions, heroes, jihadists, and role models, and 
framing children as taking part in societal and institutional roles, such as learning in schools, 
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reading Qur’an, being taken care of in hospitals, or living in social care or orphanages. This 
connotes the two most dominant frames ISIS attempts to use to frame itself: a large fighter 
group, and a state, with all its institutional roles.  
 
Selective Moral disengagement- Research Question 2- 
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the seven mechanisms of moral disengagement 
in their rhetoric? And for the moral disengagement of its fighters and supporters? 
The purpose of the second part of the study was to recognize the existence of the elements of 
moral disengagement in the rhetoric of Dabiq. After conducting the content analysis, it was 
found that all 7 mechanisms were indeed present in the writing of Dabiq, and in fact, and very 
significantly present, with some mechanisms, such as moral justification, present in 97.1% of the 
whole population of Dabiq rhetoric, and other mechanisms, such as dehumanization of victims, 
being present in 41% of the whole rhetoric. Even though the dehumanization mechanism is the 
least present mechanism, it takes place in 41% of the population, which signifies how heavily 
these mechanisms are used in the writing of Dabiq.  
 The most largely present mechanism used in Dabiq is the mechanism of moral 
justification. Moral justification, appearing in 97.1% of the population, appears in two ways: 
justifying aggressiveness in the name of God and religious principles, and justifying 
aggressiveness in the name of reprimanding political states and governments for their actions and 
their policies. According to Bandura, people are unable to conduct inhumane or harmful actions 
unless they have justified them first. Through moral justification of their acts ISIS soldiers are 
able to conduct harmful and atrocious acts while viewing themselves as moral agents acting in 
the name of religious principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalist imperatives.  
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 The second mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of Euphemistic labelling. 
In Dabiq, euphemistic and sanitized labels are given to ISIS’ soldiers, to make them appear as 
moral agents, fighters for God, and heroes, instead of framing them as terrorists and criminals. 
Sanitized labels are given to ISIS’ victims and opponents to morally disengage the soldiers 
inflicting harm upon them and to morally disengage the supporters and citizens of ISIS from 
feeing sympathetic towards them.  Victims and opponents are given labels such as Kuffar, 
murtaddin, and Crusaders. ISIS’ acts of violence are also given sanitized labels such as cleaning 
instead of massacring. This causes a decrease in the moral agent in soldiers as the terms make the 
act sound less invasive and less violent. Another technique of euphemistic labelling, which is 
also present in the rhetoric, is the technique of using the agentless passive voice. In this 
technique, inhumane and violent acts appear as the works of nameless forces, not humans, thus 
turning objects into agents. This technique is very effective in relieving the soldiers of the 
responsibility of the actions, and thus weakening their moral agency and causing them to be 
more comfortable committing violent acts.  
 The third mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of using advantageous 
comparisons. This mechanism occurs when an entity compares its actions with the more 
reprehensible actions of other entities, for its own advantageous benefit and/or to make its acts 
seem more righteous. In the case of Dabiq, ISIS repeatedly uses this technique to compare its 
actions to these of other governments such as the US government and the Israeli government. 
The worse the contrasting inhumanities are, the more mild and benevolent one’s destructive 
conduct will seem. Using this technique allows soldiers to perceive their actions to be mild and 
righteous in comparison to others’, as opposed to seeing their actions as violent and atrocious 
murders.  
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 The fourth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of displacement of 
responsibility. This mechanism is perhaps one of the most powerful mechanisms for moral 
disengagement, and it is very widely used in 94.2% the population of the magazine. Moral 
control strongly operates when individuals know they’re responsible for the harm of others, 
however by minimizing and obscuring one’s agentive role, moral disengagement takes over. In 
Dabiq, ISIS uses this mechanism in two ways: displacing the responsibility on God, Islam or son 
a higher hierarchal power, and displacing the responsibility on the opponents, by mentioning the 
wrong-doings of the opponents, their actions and policies and implying that the opponents 
deserve to be punished for their acts, and thus displacing the responsibility on them.  
 The fifth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of diffusion of 
responsibility. Diffusion of responsibility happens when an act is committed by a group instead 
of a single individual, thus when everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible. This 
appears in the magazine in two ways: having soldiers act collectively in most of their violent 
acts, for instance, group fighting, suicide bombings in groups, and groups attacks, and also 
convincing the soldiers that they’re acting with God, with the aid of God, and by God’s side, so 
the responsibility is diffused with God, and the soldiers are more inclined to perform graphic acts 
as long as they perceive God to be on their side. 
 The sixth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of distortion or disregard 
of consequences. This mechanism plays on obscuring or minimizing one’s harmful impact of 
inhumane activities, thus resulting in soldiers carrying out inhumane activities without having to 
face the harm they caused. This mechanism is triggered by the use of advance artillery and death 
technologies as these forms of technologies allow soldiers to commit violent mass acts without 
ever having to even see their victims. Only by pressing a button, or pointing a laser beam that the 
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victim gets affected, but the perpetrator never gets to closely see or face the victim. This allows 
the soldiers to commit harmful acts more freely and at a much bigger scale.  
 The final mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of dehumanization. 
Regarding one’s victim as human as oneself activates empathetic reactions, which are unwanted 
reactions in the case of terrorist and fighter groups such as ISIS. Therefore, in Dabiq, ISIS plays 
on dehumanizing many of its victims and opponents in order to devalue them and allow their 
soldiers and supports to easily inflict pain on them. In Dabiq, dehumanizing the victims appears 
in the form of labelling the victims and opponents using labels such as filthy beasts, unfortunate 
creatures, animals, and mindless savages, as well as attributing beastial and satanic qualities to 
them. 
Effect of Moral Disengagement  
 The 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement are very significantly present in the rhetoric 
of the magazine. In at least 41% of the articles, all 7 mechanisms could be present in the one 
article. ISIS uses Dabiq, to morally disengage its soldiers and supporters. Through the use of 
these 7 mechanisms, ISIS’ soldiers successfully committed a number of very violent and 
aggressive acts. Moreover, through the use of moral disengagement, ISIS supporters continue to 
support their case. On another note, being the official and only English language publication 
produced by ISIS, this magazine is used in the recruiting process of Western jihadists, thus by 
imposing the mechanisms of moral disengagement, one can argue that moral disengagement 
plays a tremendous role that is crucial for the acceptance of a foreign audience of the content of 
the magazine. 
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Creating a unified identity- Research Question 3-  
How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the framing and moral disengagement 
mechanisms to attempt to create a unified identity? 
 According to Ingram, ISIS’ main purpose for the usage of its media is to “shape the 
perceptions and polarize the support of its audiences”, (Ingram, 2014). In its media, ISIS targets 
both its “friends” and “foes”, while strategically using the frames of in-group versus out-group. 
In Dabiq, ISIS associates concepts of crisis with the framed “out-group” identities, and 
associated concepts of solutions and change with the framed “in-group” identities. This 
technique, according to Ingram, is used to keep the “in-group” supportive and loyal. Through 
Dabiq, ISIS also employs itself as the protector of its “in-group” against all those framed as “out-
groups”. On the other hand, ISIS exaggerates the identities of the “out-groups”, such as Shi’ite 
Muslims, Christians, and Westerners, and associates these identities with malaise and 
viciousness. ISIS divides the world into these two groups only, “the camp of Islam and faith, and 
the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy,” (Ingram, 2014). Ingram states ISIS’ only solution to 
the current crisis, which is the elimination and complete annihilation of any and all framed out-
group identities. This is, according to Ingram, one main pillar for the unification of Muslims 
against the threat of the out-groups. Through framing of the in-group and out-group, ISIS 
attempts to create a unified identity for its perceived community. By morally disengaging its in-
group, ISIS strives to keep it loyal, supportive and active towards achieving its cause and 
purpose. 
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7.2.2: Hypotheses-  
HYPOTHESIS 1  
Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized 
labels to these actions. 
One of ISIS’ main purposes in their magazine Dabiq is boasting about accomplishing their 
violent acts, yet describing and framing these acts in a way that makes ISIS appear to be a moral 
agent. This process of framing takes place through the use of attributing euphemistic and 
sanitized labels to violent actions. A chi square test was performed to test this relationship 
between the framing ISIS’ acts of violence and attributing euphemistic labels attributed to the 
acts being framed. Results indicate a highly significant relationship (Chi square χ2 = 84.511 
(p=0.000)) between the variables suggesting that framing violent acts conducted by ISIS does in 
fact take place through the attribution of sanitized and euphemistic labels to these acts. This 
process of framing violent acts using sanitized labels allows the violent acts to appear less 
invasive, and less violent, and therefore assists in the moral disengagement of ISIS’ soldiers and 
supporters. This hypothesis is therefore supported.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2  
There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral 
disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq 
conducted by ISIS.  
One of the main purposes of this study is to analyze and study the existence of the mechanisms 
of moral disengagement in the rhetoric of ISIS’ magazine, to test whether ISIS truly applies the 7 
mechanisms of the theory to disengage the morality of its soldiers and supporters. For the 
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purpose of testing this hypothesis, a chi square test was administered for each and every 
mechanism of moral disengagement to test the relationship between the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement and the violent acts conducted by ISIS. The purpose of these chi square tests 
were to identify a relationship between the violent acts of ISIS and the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement.  
 
Mechanism 1- Moral justification 
 
When it came to testing the mechanism of Moral justification and ISIS’ violent acts, it was found 
that there is a strong positive relationship between the two variables, indicating that this 
mechanism is, in fact, applied by ISIS when mentioning and describing its violent acts. A chi 
square test was performed to test the relationship between the two variables and it indicated a 
highly significant relationship (Chi square χ2 = 14.061 (p=0.001) highly significant) between the 
two variables.  
 
Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling 
 
As for the second mechanism, euphemistic labelling, a chi square was administered to test the 
relationship between the use of euphemistic labelling and the presence of violent acts.  
The chi square test showed a highly significant (Chi square χ2 = 16.770 (p=0.000) highly 
significant) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS’ acts of violence and the 
euphemistic labels attributed to them. 
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Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling- Using the agentless passive voice 
 
Under euphemistic labelling exists another technique of the same mechanism, which is the use of 
the agentless passive voice. A chi square test was performed to test the relationship between the 
technique of using the agentless passive voice, and the presence of violent acts. The chi square 
performed showed another highly significant (Chi square χ2 = 21.081 (p=0.000) highly 
significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that this technique is surely used in 
the moral disengagement of soldiers and supporters when describing and mentioning violent and 
graphic acts. 
 
 
Mechanism 3- Using advantageous comparisons-  
 
Using advantageous comparisons is another one of the mechanisms used for the moral 
disengagement of ISIS’ soldiers and supporters. A chi square test was performed to test the 
relationship between the technique of using the advantageous comparisons, and the presence of 
violent acts. The chi square performed showed a significant (Chi square χ2 = 8.946 (p=0.011) 
significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that the usage f advantageous 
comparisons does take place in the rhetoric in accordance with the mentioning and describing of 
the violent acts of ISIS.  
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Mechanism 4- Diffusion of responsibility-  
 
Diffusion of responsibility is a mechanism that is heavily present in the issues. Diffusion of 
responsibility refers to the act of making soldiers act collectively, or with God, and therefore not 
feel like they are responsible for their acts. . A chi square test was performed to test the 
relationship between the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility, and the presence of violent 
acts. The chi square performed showed a highly significant (Chi square χ2 = 23.117 (p=0.000) 
Highly significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that diffusing the 
responsibility from the soldiers does take place in the rhetoric in accordance with the mentioning 
and describing of the violent acts of ISIS.  
 
 
Mechanism 5- Displacement of responsibility-  
 
Perhaps, one of the most significantly used mechanisms in the rhetoric of Dabiq is the 
mechanism of displacement of responsibility, where, largely, the responsibility of the violent 
actions were placed on God’s hands, or in the enemy’s hands. Upon administering the chi square 
test to test out the relationship between the two variables, displacement of responsibility and the 
presence of inhumane or violent acts, a very highly significant (Chi square = 22.084  (p=0.000) 
Highly significant) relationship was established between the variables. This dictates that this 
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mechanism is in fact heavily used in the magazine in accordance with the mentioning and 
describing of atrocious acts.  
 
 
Mechanism 6- Disregard or Distortion of Consequences- 
 
As a method of disengaging the morality of their soldiers and supporters, ISIS trains its soldiers 
to disregard or distort the consequences of their acts. This can range from ignoring a crying child 
of war, till learning the usage of very advanced artillery that doesn’t allow you the perpetrator to 
see the victim, let alone interact with him of feel empathy. The chi square test performed on this 
mechanism showed a highly significant (Chi square = 54.989 (p=0.000) Highly significant) 
relationship between the two variables. 
 
Mechanism 7- Dehumanization of victims- 
 
Dehumanizing someone’s victims usually plays a big role in the moral disengagement of the 
perpetrator. For the purpose of the study, a chi square test was conducted to test the relationship 
between the presence of inhumane acts in the magazine, and the dehumanization of the 
perpetrator’s victims. The chi square test showed a highly significant (Chi square = 28.669 
(p=0.000) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables, suggesting that this 
variable does in fact have a strong positive relationship with the presence of violent actions in 
Dabiq. 
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In the cases of all 7 mechanisms, it was shown that all of the 7 mechanisms of moral 
disengagement in fact had strong positive relationships with the presence of violent actions. In 
other words, it was shown that the presence of violent actions is highly significantly related to 
the usage of the mechanisms of selective moral disengagement, thus the hypothesis is supported. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS’ usage of the mechanism of moral 
justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of 
responsibility. 
 
A chi square test was conducted to test the relationship of two mechanisms of moral 
disengagement: moral justification and displacement of responsibility. Through the chi square 
test, it was shown that the usage of moral justification takes place through displacement of 
responsibility, either on Allah and religious principles, or on opposing governments. The chi 
square conducted for this hypothesis showed a highly significant (Chi square χ2 = 96.280 
(p=0.000) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables. Thus, this shows that the 
hypothesis is once more supported.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion  
Ingram says that ISIS’ main purpose for the usage of its media is to “shape the perceptions and 
polarize the support of its audiences”, (Ingram, 2014). The main conclusion of this research is 
that ISIS does in fact use its media, and its media tactics, such as its framing techniques and its 
usage of the mechanisms of moral disengagement, to shape the perceptions of its audiences and 
to create polarized identities of in-group and out-group.   
The main findings of the study show that unlike the way Islamist extremists are portrayed in the 
media, they portray themselves in a very different light. ISIS portrays its soldiers as moral agents 
and its supporters as role models. It portrays its opponents and non-supporters as part of the out-
group and as enemies who deserve to be punished. As for their acts of violence, they are merely 
portrayed as the only means to achieving peace and to gaining God’s acceptance.  
The second set of findings shows that ISIS uses the mechanisms of moral disengagement to 
disengage the morality of their soldiers, supporters and audience. Dabiq, according to research, is 
found to have magnetized over 12,000 soldiers from all over the world. I would argue that the 
usage of these 7 mechanisms plays a very crucial role in this recruitment process. It allows men 
and women from all over the world to leave their whole lives behind and travel to ISIS-
controlled territories, risking their lives, to fight for what they were manipulated to think is a 
moral and holy cause. These mechanisms are an extremely dangerous weapon that we see being 
used in our everyday lives; from people morally disengaging themselves to control others, 
whether it’s at home or at work, to large businesses using the mechanisms to lay people off from 
work, to governments refusing to take in refugees, to students bullying their school mates, to 
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nations going to war against less fortunate and less powerful nations, to extremely lethal radical 
organizations trying to gain power, and the list doesn’t end.  
 ISIS is an organization with extremely strong and smart media strategies. It uses a 
combination of extremely powerful psychological tactics to securely reach its goals and to create 
a magnitude of propaganda for itself. Their media content is very widely circulated. This mass-
mediated terrorist content is no longer concerned with the act of harming a single individual or a 
small group, but rather it focuses on exploiting the media for attention and publicity; it goes 
beyond the confines of violence and has become a spectacle (Eid, 2013; Nacos, 2003). Which 
brings us to the theatre of terror, the phenomenon adopted by radical terrorist groups where they 
take advantage of mass-media to perform their acts of violence on television for the whole world 
to see. ISIS very strategically choreographs its acts to attract media attention, through the usage 
of theatrical production elements such as scripts, casts, sets, props and stage management, to 
elevate the drama and make sure every step of the way is largely publicized. This modern form 
of terrorism is what Weimann calls psychological warfare. The usage of these psychological 
elements and means of persuasion go beyond the immediate harm of the victim, but rather aim to 
frighten thousands. Through the use of mediated, orchestrated symbolic violence, together with 
mechanisms of psychological persuasion, such as framing, and mechanisms of moral 
disengagement, the terrorists’ effect has a much larger and amplified effect, which has the ability 
to reach millions of people, and magnetize thousands of fighters into this whirlpool of 
psychological manipulation.  
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Chapter 9  
Recommendations for Future Research  
 The research body available on the theory of selective moral disengagement is barely 
ever applied on terrorism and terrorist-produced publications. Most research available on the 
theory of selective moral disengagement is applied on bullying and cyberbullying (Greenhalgh, 
et al., 2015), as well as government policies and refugee studies, and government actions, such as 
the Nazi gas chambers which resulted in the killing of over 6 million Jews (Cory, 2015). A 
substantial amount of the research on the theory is also present on unethical science and business 
practices which resulted in financial loss, such as the accounting scandals that lead to the 
economic crises of 2000 and 2008, as well as environmental destruction, and preventable deaths, 
such as the oil drilling rig explosion in Mexico in 2010, which killed 11 crewmen, and caused 
the spilling of 210 million gallons of oil in the Gulf of Mexico (Cory, 2015). Future research is 
needed on the application of the theory of selective moral disengagement on terrorism and 
terrorist-produced media. 
The majority of research available on framing and terrorism is focused on how terrorism 
is framed in the media, whether by media agencies, governments, or civilian populations, 
however, very limited research is available on the frames used with the terrorist-media itself. 
Terrorist organizations make use of their media to frame themselves, their enemies, and their 
actions. An abundance of frames are used in terrorist-produced media, which should be analyzed. 
 Research on the rhetoric of terrorist-produced media is also very limited. Future research 
should focus on the contextual and in-depth analyses of the rhetorical language being used in 
terrorist-produced media.  
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Furthermore, research should include in-depth analyses of the issues and of the 
mechanisms being used for moral disengagement, as well as of the frames being used in terrorist-
produced media and publications. Additionally, more research should be conducted on the other 
forms of media produced by ISIS, such as their videos, YouTube channels, and poetry and songs.  
For the purpose of this study, a content analysis was geared towards using a full article as 
the unit of analysis, as the whole article provides contextual value. However, more content 
analyses should be conducted to analyze certain key terms and phrases (such as kuffar, 
murtaddin, mujahideen), and the frequency of their existence in the article, and ratio of their 
existence compared to other key terms and phrases. 
 In this study, the focus of the analysis was on the rhetoric of the magazine and not the 
graphic content. In addition to the analysis of the rhetoric, in-depth analyses of the graphics and 
imagery in terrorist-produced publications should be analyzed, as these graphic portrayals are 
extremely loaded with content, themes and frames. The graphic imagery in the magazine Dabiq, 
as well as other terrorist-produced media, is very substantial and rich with messages and content.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Chapter 10 
Limitations of the Study 
The main limitation in this study is the fact that the whole population analyzed is 
considered a small population. Dabiq only published 15 issues, since its debut, and therefore 
when the whole issues were analyzed, the population mounted up to be 205 articles only.  
 Unlike other research on terrorist-produced publications such as Al Qaeda’s Inspire and 
Taliban’s Azan, very little research has been conducted on ISIS’ Dabiq. Therefore, this study has 
been geared towards an overview analysis of the general themes used in the magazine, and the 
main messages communicated through the publication. However, more in-depth research is 
needed to fully explore and analyze the issue at hand.  
 Moreover, for the sake of this study, the unit of analysis being the whole article merely 
indicated the presence of frames and moral disengagement mechanisms in the articles. However, 
these issues should be analyzed using a narrower unit of analysis to give more weight and 
substance to the amount of existence of the frames and of the mechanisms.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Coding Book-   
The following coding categories will be used to assess and analyze the selected articles from 
Dabiq- 
 
Technical Data- 
1. Issue Number-  
Coder will supply the number of the issue (from 1 through 15). 
2. Page Number- 
Coder will supply the number of the page in which the article being analyzed is on. 
3. Slug- 
Coder will supply a slug for the article being coded 
4. Size of article-  
1= small (1 page or less) 
2= medium (more than one page, up till 3 pages) 
3= large (more than 3 pages) 
General Information- 
5. Format of article- 
1= News report 
2= Feature 
3= Foreword/ Introduction 
4= In the enemy’s words 
0= Other- please specify 
6. Theme of article- 
1= boasting of accomplishments/ successes,  reporting on capturing/ occupation,  prominent 
executions/ foley and moath and others 
2= reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents, warning the enemy 
3= reporting on services provided for citizens 
4= advices, teachings 
5= reporting on trainings and training camps provided for ISIS’ soldiers 
0= Other- please specify 
Framing- 
7. Framing ISIS as-  
1= Gateway to heaven 
2= Caliphate/ governing entity, large political entity/ terrorizes the enemy 
3= Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity 
0= other- please specify 
8. Framing ISIS supporters as-  
1= Obedient to God/ Islam, true Muslims, brothers, role models for following ISIS 
2= Victims 
3= Terrorists, evil, criminals 
4= endangered by the ruling political regime/ other political entities (opponent countries/ 
opponent organizations) 
0= other- please specify 
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9. Framing ISIS opponents as-  
1= Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling and name-calling 
2= Innocent members of different communities who should be defended and protected. 
0= other- please specify 
10. Framing ISIS soldiers as- 
1= Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, 
martyrs (died for God) 
2= Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers 
0= other- please specify 
11. Framing ISIS victims as- 
1= Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards 
2= Innocent humans who should be saved 
0= other- please specify 
12. Framing ISIS acts of violence as-  
1= Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and religious purpose. 
2= Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence 
3= Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act 
0= other- please specify 
13. Presence of women in article? 
1= yes 
2= No  
14. If no, skip category 
If Yes, Framing of women- 
1= portrayed as fighters 
2= portrayed as victims 
3= portrayed as brides/ wives 
4= portrayed as criminals 
5=portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves 
6= portrayed as mothers/ wives/ supporters of their husbands 
7= portrayed as leaders 
8= portrayed as teachers 
0= other- please specify 
15. Presence of children/ youth in article? 
1= yes 
2= No 
16. If no, skip category, 
If yes, framing children/ youth- 
1= portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heros/ seeds of ISIS/ the next generation of ISIS  jihadis 
2= portrayed as victims  
3= portrayed as criminals 
4= portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child labour, slavery, kidnapping) 
5= taking part in social and institutional roles (learning, reading, in social care, in health care) 
0= other- please specify 
17. Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts- 
1= Yes 
2= No 
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Elements of moral disengagement-  
18. Moral justification for inhumane acts- 
1= aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles 
2= reprimanding political states/ governments 
3= Does not take place 
19. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers- 
Sanitized labels given to soldiers labeled such as mujahidin, martyrs 
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
20. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Victims/opponents- 
Sanitized labels given to ISIS victims and/or opponents such as crusaders, mushrikin, kufar 
1= Takes Place 
2= Doesn’t take place 
21. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence-  
Sanitized labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence such as waste, finish off 
1= Takes Place 
2= Doesn’t take place 
22. Using the agentless passive voice- 
Making inhumane acts appear as the works of nameless forces, not humans 
Turning objects into agents 
1= Takes Place 
2= Doesn’t take place 
23. Using advantageous comparisons- 
ISIS’ acts are compared with more reprehensible acts, to make ISIS’ seem righteous.  
ex- Terrorists’ behaviour is viewed as self martyrdom when compared to the cruelty of their 
enemies.  
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
24. Displacement of responsibility- 
1= Carrying out allah’s orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority’s orders, including ISIS 
2= Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves) 
3= Does not take place 
25. Diffusion of responsibility-  
Soldiers act alone- act together- collective violence in armies- with allah 
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
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26. Disregard or Distortion of Consequences- 
Distorting consequences- rewards of heaven, not hell, suffering is good so the victims learn... 
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
27. Dehumanization of victims- 
Making the victim’s suffering and pain more arousing, stripping victims of their human qualities 
and dehumanizing them, victims are merely regarded as sub-human objects, mindless savages, 
unfortunate creatures, attributing demonic and beastial qualities to the victims, visualizing them 
as low animal forms and satanic creatures, perpetrators become power holders who devalue those 
they wield control over  
1= Takes Place 
2= Does not take place 
 
